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Abstract 
 
 
The essence of this study is about structural change and how it is affected by 
competing social forces. My primary aim is to examine the problems and 
contradictions in Mozambique‟s development strategy and to gain an understanding 
of how these problems are influenced by the structure of the contemporary world 
order. A central focus will be on how social forces at various levels influence the way 
in which development strategy is formed through superior material capabilities, 
shaping ideas and establishing institutions. The main argument is that the 
hegemonic neoliberalist ideology has been perpetuated in Mozambique by external 
social forces and has become the mainstay of the development approach in the 
country. By acknowledging that theory is used by different social groups for various 
purposes, I depart from the common assumption of considering the Mozambican 
development example as a success, and rather ask „for whom it has been a success‟. 
The theoretical approach in this study is based on Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) and a 
significant proportion is dedicated to evaluate Cox‟s works and how he applies his 
theoretical framework in the analysis of the changing world order. To get a better 
appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of CCT, the study will also examine 
the works of several scholars that use CCT in their studies of social forces in 
Southern Africa. The case study will be guided by the findings generated by the 
theoretical evaluation, particularly with regards to the way CCT allows for various 
points on entry in the analysis.  
The case study of Mozambique generated three main conclusions. Firstly, that 
Frelimo has failed to create a broad based consensus for its ideology among 
different social forces in Mozambique and that the historic bloc in Mozambique 
remains fragile. Secondly, that the economic elite in South Africa and the ANC 
collaborated with Frelimo in structuring the development strategy in Mozambique, 
and through this collaboration, perpetuated values consistent with the hegemonic 
neoliberal consensus. Finally, that the prevailing order in Mozambique is 
strengthened by the involvement of the international community and that structural 
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change is unlikely to take place without the development of a stronger civil society. 
The theoretical contribution of the study has been to further support that the logic 
provided by CCT remains valid in the African context, and that it is highly compatible 
with other social theories. Furthermore, the study concludes that CCT is particularly 
compatible with post-colonial theory and social psychology and can be used to 
address the shortcomings of each other. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die sentrale punt van die studie is strukturele verandering en hoe dit beïnvloed word 
deur mededingende sosiale kragte. Die primêre doel van die tesis is om die 
probleme en teenstrydighede in Mosambiek se ontwikkelingstrategie te ondersoek 
en om te verstaan hoe hierdie probleme verband hou met die struktuur van die 
teenswoordige wêreld-orde. ‟n Belangrike fokus is ook hoe sosiale kragte op verskeie 
vlakke die wyse waarop ontwikkelingstrategie gevorm word beïnvloed, via besondere 
materiële vermoeëns, die vorm van idees en die skep van instellings. Die hoof 
argument is dat „n hegemoniese neoliberale ideologie perpetueer is in Mosambiek 
deur eksterne sosiale kragte en dat dit sodoende die bakermat van dié land se 
benadering tot ontwikkeling geword het. Deur te erken dat teorie deur verskillende 
sosiale groepe vir uiteenlopende redes gebruik word, beweeg ek weg van die 
algemene aanname, naamlik dat ontwikkeling in Mosambiek as suksesvol beskou 
kan word. Die vraag moet eerder gestel word, “vir wie is ontwikkeling in Mosambiek 
„n sukses?” 
Die teoretiese benadering in hierdie studie is gegrond op Coxiaanse Kritiese Teorie 
(CKT) en „n betekenisvolle proporosie van die studie word gewy aan „n evaluering 
van Cox se benadering en hoe hy dit toepas in „n analise van die veranderende 
wêreld-orde. Ten einde „n beter waardering daar te stel vir die voor- en nadele van 
CKT, ondersoek die studie ook die bydraes van „n aantal ander geleerdes wat die 
benadering gebruik in hul bestudering van sosiale kragte in Suider-Afrika. Die 
gevalle-studie word gerig deur die bevindinge wat gegenereer word deur hierdie 
teoretiese evaluering, in die besonder met betrekking tot die manier waarop CKT die 
gebruik van verskillende invalshoeke tot die analise fasiliteer. 
Die Mosambiekse gevalle-studie lewer drie hoof-gevolgtrekkings op. Eerstens, dat 
FRELIMO nie daarin geslaag het, om „n breë konsensus vir sy ideologiese 
uitgangspunte onder die verskillende sosiale kragte in die land te skep nie. 
Derhalwe, is die „historiese blok‟ in Mosambiek kwesbaar. Tweedens, dat die 
ekonomiesse elite in Suid-Afrika en binne die African National Congress (ANC) 
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saamgewerk het met FRELIMO om die ontwikkelingstrategie in Mosambiek te 
struktureer. In daardie opsig, is waardes perpetueer wat saamhang met die 
hegemoniese neoliberale konsensus. Laatstens, dat die heersende orde in 
Mosambiek versterk word deur die betrokkenheid van die internasionale 
gemeenskap en dat strukturele verandering in dié land onwaarskynlik is sonder die 
ontwikkeling van „n sterker burgerlike samelewing. Die teoretiese bydrae van die 
studie ondersteun verder die premis dat CKT geldig bly binne die konteks van Afrika 
en dat dit versoenbaar is met ander sosiale teorieë. Verder, word die gevolgtrekking 
gemaak dat CKT ook besonder versoenbaar is met post-koloniale teorie en sosiale 
sielkunde en dat dit gebruik kan word om die tekortkominge in elkeen aan te spreek. 
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Chapter 1 
Aim, Scope and Method 
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
The aim of this study is to examine the problems and contradictions in 
Mozambique‟s development strategy and to gain an understanding of how these 
problems are influenced by the structure of the contemporary world order. A central 
focus will be on how social forces at various levels influence the way in which 
development strategy is formed through superior material capabilities, shaping ideas 
and establishing institutions. The study will argue that the establishment of a 
neoliberal market oriented development strategy in Mozambique reflects the 
influence of forces at the global, regional and domestic level. Furthermore, the study 
will argue that there is no value free theory and that the approach to understanding 
African relations within the mainstream debate in international political economics 
(IPE) reflects the interests of certain groups. Cox (1981, p. 207) has famously stated 
that „theory is always for someone and for some purpose‟. To understand why a 
particular developmental strategy prevails in Mozambique, it is vital to understand 
the context it is formed in, and what it is intends to accomplish. The evaluation and 
measurement of the success and failures of such policies is likely to reflect on the 
questions that are asked, the indicators that are chosen, and the approach of the 
analyst. In order to understand possible alternative strategies in Mozambique, it is 
important to critically question the fundamental underpinnings of the current order.    
After two decades of failure in Africa, many economists in the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) now seem relieved that a majority of the countries they have been 
involved in around Sub-Saharan Africa are finally experiencing stable growth. 
Despite putting strong pressure on African countries to conform to the Washington 
consensus through „structural adjustment programs‟ in the 1980s, which involved 
opening their markets, maintaining strong macroeconomic stability and privatizing 
their economies, most countries in the region seemed to be unable to turn around 
their economic decline. In the last ten years however, it seems like Africa has finally 
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turned a corner in its development history, and the World Bank (2007) reports that 
most countries‟ economies are growing with at least five percent per annum, some 
at nearly double that. Furthermore, they use a variety of indicators to illustrate that 
the substantial gains in health and literacy rates are signs that a broad based 
developmental process is taking place throughout the continent. Liberalist scholars  
(Hoekman, 2005; Krugman, 2006; Wolf, 2004) now point to Africa and claim that 
this finally illustrates that the logic behind liberal market development policies are 
right and that the answer to the world‟s poverty problems  is to further expand the 
magnitude of the unrestricted global market.   
However, the gatherings of the institutions promoting such a market expansion, 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the G8, have been plagued with 
angry crowds of alienated youth protesting at what they claim to be a process driven 
by the interest of rich capitalists (Attack, 2009).  Critiques of the Washington 
consensus have argued that the implementations of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in the 1980s have mainly been to the benefit of a fortunate few, and that the 
result of the programs has been to generate losers, as well as winners, in the 
development process. Payne (2005:14) describes how the extended liberalization of 
trade and finance has increased unequal development between rich and poor on 
both a domestic as well as an international level. He explains how these programs 
have reduced the capacities of governments in developing countries to shape the 
social order within their country and the international level. Furthermore, the market 
dependent development approach has been criticised for having a too narrow 
conception of development, and that it does not take sufficiently into account how 
increased international competition can eradicate small scale local production 
through flooding markets with cheap imports, thus limiting the freedom of many 
marginalised populations to choose their livelihood (Sen, 1999:23). The magnitude 
of popular support and media attention given to these critics of the Washington 
Consensus could indicate that fundamental issues with the SAPs need to be 
addressed and changed in order to better serve the people that they claim to be 
directed at.  
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The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) stated that the aims of the market liberalising 
development strategies, advocated in the 1970s and 1980s, were to address 
problems with domestic markets that acted as barriers to economic growth and 
thereby development (Stigliz, 2003). These problems were perceived to be of 
domestic origin, and external factors were seen as fixed and were therefore not 
addressed. Thérien (1999:732) describes how the BWI did not regard poverty as a 
derivative from „asymmetrical inequalities in the structure of the global political 
economy, but as a result of a temporary misadaptation of markets‟. Fundamental 
problems concerning the underpinning of the globalised market system were 
therefore left largely unchallenged. By neglecting these problems, this approach to 
development has played a facilitating role in entrenching the contemporary global 
order and has been unable to contribute to changing the structural injustices that it 
contain. To identify possible alternatives to the current world order, one would have 
to understand the structural characteristics that underpin and maintain it. 
The signing of the peace treaty between the two warring factions in Mozambique, 
Frelimo and Renamo, in 1992 marked the end of 25 years of unrest and civil war. 
Throughout the conflict Mozambique had gone through an immense political and 
economic transition, from being authoritarian capitalist during the colonial times, to 
authoritarian socialist after independence, to finally becoming more of a model 
patient envisioned in the neo-liberal prescriptions of the BWIs with democracy and 
market oriented development programs (Pitcher, 2002). The war had been 
tremendously expensive, and at its end the Mozambican population was among the 
absolute poorest in the world, with 69 percent living under the poverty line (Hanlon, 
2007:7). It was widely acknowledged within the international community that 
Mozambique needed vast economic growth and a reduction in the number of poor in 
order to prevent a backslide into conflict. Most of the development initiatives, under 
the management of the UN, states, or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
were directed at dealing with the grievances of the most marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups in the country (UNDP, 2005). These initiatives included large 
scale demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programs and projects focused 
on poverty relief, which have been further supported in the last years by the 
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drawing up of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. The MDGs have 
become the backbone of most development programs among the poorest countries 
around the world, and underline the importance of meeting peoples most basic 
needs before other development objectives can be met.  
In Mozambique, the government has actively declared its support to these goals and 
has, in close collaboration with international organisations, donors and investors, 
structured its main development programs, the Action Plan for Absolute Poverty 
Reduction (PARPA) and Agenda 2025, to achieve the goals outlined in the MDGs. 
Although there seems to be nearly unanimous support for achieving the MDGs, 
deeper analysis of the programs reveal that the underlying strategy for how to reach 
them contain ideological principles that favours private investment from big business 
and marginalises the role of the government. It thus becomes relevant to question 
who these programs are intended to serve.  
After experiencing some economically rough years in the immediate period after the 
signing of the peace treaty, Mozambique can now look back at more than a decade 
of blistering high growth rates (World Bank, 2007). In the post-war period, 
Mozambique has become a “donor darling” and has attracted high levels of aid and 
investment. Donors enjoyed a large amount of policy space in the implementation of 
their projects and big business has been attracted by reduced taxation and 
subsidies. The projects have often been of a very large scale, either through large 
scale human development initiatives or through industrial mega projects. However, 
despite being described by the IMF (2007:14) as the „success story of Sub-Saharan 
Africa‟ with „strong broad-based growth and deep poverty reduction‟, there are many 
critics that are far from supportive of that claim. Despite the phenomenal growth 
that Mozambique has experienced over the last decade the chances that they will 
meet the MDGs remain highly unlikely (Hanlon, 2007).  
Much of the debate on development in Mozambique has been focused on whether it 
can be labelled pro-poor, which as described above, has been an underlying goal for 
most of the programs. Supporters of market dependent development strategies have 
argued that economic growth alone should be considered pro-poor as it benefits all 
sections of society through the “trickle-down effect” (Terreblanche, 2003:147). 
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James et al. (2005) challenge this argument by showing that purchasing power has 
increased the most for the richer part of the population, thus increasing inequality, 
and that rising prices have offset any increase in income for the marginalised groups 
in Mozambique. This is supported by Hanlon (2007) who criticizes the indicators that 
use the “one-dollar-a-day” measurement of poverty because it does not give an 
accurate measure of actual poverty. He claims that if one bases the measurement of 
poverty on food basket indicators, that a decrease in poverty is much less clear, and 
that because of population growth, the actual number of poor has increased over 
the last five years. This has been further exaggerated since the escalation in the 
price of food and fuel increased prices for basic necessities in 2006. Castel-Branco 
(forthcoming) argues that large increases in inequality, increasing signs of aid 
dependency, increasing proportions of the population being malnourished and larger 
economic vulnerability illustrate the shortcomings of the current growth oriented 
strategy. He points out that the discrepancies in the evaluation of the results of 
these projects is a reflection of the differences in how people view these projects 
and on the nature of the questions asked of them.  To understand these differences 
it is important to problematise their fundamental nature and the underlying 
assumptions that they are founded upon. This would include questioning the 
balancing of roles between government and market in a development process which 
is advocated by the Washington consensus.  
1.2 Problem solving theory versus critical theory 
I started this introduction by stating that knowledge and theory is dependent on the 
context and perspective in which it is produced and applied. So far I have made 
claims regarding the implementation of neoliberal market oriented development 
programs and their results. Furthermore, I have described how the debate 
characterised by disagreements on the nature of development and how to measure 
it. To substantiate these claims, I will examine how the success of the current 
development strategies in Mozambique depends on which groups one takes into the 
analysis and how it is measured. Although there has been much scholarly focus on 
the success and failures of the Mozambican development programs, relatively little 
focus has been put on the roles and motivations of the actors that have been 
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involved in their formation. Although the actors that are involved in the formation of 
policies often make official statements concerning their motivations, they may have 
underlying intentions behind their actions that may be more complicated to find 
(Stigliz, 2003). In order to understand the different arguments in the debates above, 
we need to understand the ideological perspectives behind them and to determine 
what the aims of the scholars involved in the debate are.  
After questioning the nature of the objectivity of theory, Cox (1981) argues that all 
theories are developed from certain perspectives and that it is impossible to divorce 
theory form a standpoint anchored in time and space. To understand the results of 
previous analyses of the development policies in Mozambique, it is important to 
examine the underlying ideology and to expose its often concealed perspectives and 
standpoints. We need to know whether the aim of the scholar is to maintain the 
existing social order or to change it. In his analysis, Cox (1981; 1995) differentiates 
between two major types of theory according to its purpose. The first type he terms 
“problem solving theory”, which considers the structures of the world as a given and 
who‟s main purpose is to „make these structures and institutions work more 
smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble‟ (Cox, 1981: 208). 
When assessing problems using this type of theory, one considers the problem only 
in relation to the specialised areas of activity in which it arose.  
The second type of theory is what Cox terms critical theory, which attempts to 
separate itself from the prevailing order and rather attempts to understand how this 
order came about. This type of theory would therefore not consider institutions and 
social power relations as set, but sees them as evolving and reflecting the dynamics 
of historical change. Critical theorists must therefore continually adjust their 
concepts and adapt them to the objects that they seek to understand and explain. 
The difference between these two types of theories also has an ideological 
background. Because problem solving theory considers structures as fixed, this type 
of theory contributes to maintaining the social order. Critical theorists, on the other 
hand, are biased towards structural change as it challenges the framework 
underpinning the prevailing order. The difference between problem solving theorists 
and critical theorists is also apparent in the approach they have to development 
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issues. Understanding the ideological foundation of development theory is therefore 
important as it will reflect the motivation of the theory.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
The Second World War ended with a shift in the power composition of the world 
political economy and with the emergence of a hegemonic phase in which the United 
States assumed a leadership position in the construction of an open world economy. 
The present world economic order was outlined during the Bretton Woods 
Conference that took place in 1944 (Abrahamsson, 2003). According to Cox (1986) 
there are three components which characterise any historical structure: material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions. Taylor (2001) argues that it is only possible to 
talk about a hegemonic world order in a Gramscian sense when these three 
components are balanced in a particular “fit”. For hegemony to occur, the leading 
state needs to base much of its power on consent, where coercion becomes less and 
less visible. To attain hegemony, in Gramscian terms, a major power needs to 
establish rules and ideologies that conform to their interests, while having the 
appearance of being of universal interests, or at least provide some material benefits 
to lesser powers (Cox, 1989:842).   
Besides the hegemon, there are a number of different actors that play a role in 
maintaining a hegemonic order. Cooper (1997) notes that within the current order, 
the USA will not engage in all issues, but rather leave room for secondary powers to 
prompt policy responses and initiatives on “low issues”, such as development and 
ecology and human rights. Cooper describes how taking on such responsibility 
makes these states middle powers. In his analysis of Japanese foreign policy, Cox 
(1989) acknowledges the role of middle powers in the international system, and 
notes how they can play a supporting role in the hegemonic world order through 
acting as a facilitating agent to manage the global order on behalf of the hegemon. 
This is based on the argument that middle powers have shown a commitment to 
maintaining orderliness and security in the international system, which have often 
resulted in their being supportive of the hegemonic status quo (Taylor, 2001). 
Jordaan (2003) expands on this argument and describes how middle powers have 
an interest in maintaining stability and predictability. Much of their commitment to 
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the international community thus becomes a „conservative strategy that has the 
effect of perpetuating the status quo, entrenching (and exacerbating) existing 
inequalities in power and wealth to their relative benefit‟ (Jordaan, 2003:167). Many 
of the states acting as middle powers have benefitted from the current world order 
and therefore have an interest in preserving it. An example of this will be given in 
the case study in chapter 4, which describes how social forces in South Africa have 
influenced neighbouring countries to pursue development strategies consistent with 
the prevailing hegemonic consensus. Cox (1995:41) describes how „policies to 
promote economic development have been very largely displaced in favour of what 
can be called global poor relief and riot control‟. For developing countries interested 
in change it is therefore important to question the motivation of the involvement of 
the donor community, and to understand how development programs impact their 
quest for change.  
I will critically examine the applicability of Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) in describing 
social relations in Africa. This will be done in three ways. First, I will evaluate the 
contents, explanations of CCT in describing power, production and world order. 
Second, I will describe the studies of three scholars, Abrahamsson (1997, 2003), 
Taylor (2001), and Leysens (2002), and evaluate their use of entry points at 
different levels to analyse social forces in Southern Africa. Finally, I will use a CCT 
framework to examine how the Mozambican development strategy has been 
influenced by various social forces on a domestic, regional and world order level.  
My research question is as follows: how have social forces in post-apartheid South 
Africa used the country‟s new geopolitical position to perpetuate the hegemonic 
ideology in Mozambique‟s development approach. I will argue that large South 
African business conglomerates influenced the African National Congress (ANC) in 
the period after they assumed power, and that they have used this influence to 
entrench a line of policies consistent with the underlying principles of the 
Washington consensus. Furthermore, I will argue that an important aspect of these 
policies has been to take a regional approach to development, and through middle 
power rhetoric, justify a high degree of South African involvement in the 
development policies of its neighbouring countries. Finally, I will show how the 
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political and economic elite in South Africa have established connections with the 
ruling party in Mozambique and how this has resulted in the setting up of a large 
scale development corridor from Mpumalanga to Maputo.   
1.4 Purpose and significance of the study  
In the middle of the twentieth century Karl Polanyi (1944) reflected on the 
transformation of western society with the increasing power of the market and an 
ultraliberal British state. Polanyi was very pessimistic in his views of such a society 
and thought its demise would lie in the polarization of rich and poor, alienation from 
traditional ways of living, and through the disintegration of social bonds. These are 
effects that are particularly apparent around the African continent today with drastic 
changes in traditional structures (Jacobsen, 2005). What separates Polanyi from 
Marxist theorists is that such ultraliberal societies would cause a “protective reaction” 
and social revolt amongst all groups in society. Cox (1995:35) stated that „the 
purpose of understanding the world is to be better able to change it‟. He proposes 
that the effect of the current market liberal world order could result in the 
emergence of a countervailing force with an alternative view of social and economic 
organisation. By critically examining the influence of the world order on developing 
countries, scholars can contribute to developing theories that contribute to 
alternative theoretical frameworks and thereby promote the transformation of state 
forms and world orders.  
The objective this study is twofold: through applying CCT I would like to strengthen 
this theoretical framework‟s applicability to developing countries, and through the 
analysis of Mozambique‟s development strategies, I hope to be better positioned to 
understand to what extent there are alternatives to the status quo. Cox has been 
criticised for being Eurocentric in his analysis, both on account of his concept of class 
identity and on account of his view on the state (Schechter, 2002). However, over 
the last decade CCT has been used by several scholars who use different points of 
entry to describe social forces at various levels in Southern Africa (Abrahamsson, 
1997; Taylor, 2001; Leysens, 2002). Abrahamsson (1997, 2003) evaluates how a 
hegemonic world order influenced Mozambique after independence. On a domestic 
level, Taylor (2001) describes how different social forces in post-apartheid South 
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Africa influenced the ANC and how this has affected their economic policies. Finally, 
Leysens (2002) analyses the marginalised groups of people in southern Africa to 
assess the likelihood of them revolting against current power structures. By 
evaluating these studies I will attempt to point out strengths and weaknesses in 
their theoretical approach. Furthermore, I aim to use these findings in the case 
study, thus further testing the applicability of CCT to the African context.   
With only seven years to go, Mozambique is in a crucial phase of its development 
program in term of realizing the MDGs (Hanlon, 2008). Although these goals might 
be overly ambitious, they illustrate the urgent need for Mozambique to emphasise 
improving the conditions for the poorest part of the population. Most of the 
evaluation of these policies is done via non-reflective problem solving theories, which 
do not critically assess alternatives to the market dependent development strategy. 
By using a CCT framework, and thereby critically assessing how social forces use 
different mechanisms to control and maintain power, I hope to be able to assess the 
current development strategy in Mozambique in relation to possible alternatives. By 
improving the knowledge in this area it leaves scholars in a better position to identify 
the social forces of the current world order and the circumstances that are capable 
of bringing about potential transformation. In this way the study will evaluate the 
neoliberal development policies and question the current balance between the state 
and the market in the development process in Mozambique.  
1.5 Research design and method 
The research approach in this study will vary. Because much of the theoretical 
approach in this study is based on CCT, I find it logical to start with an evaluation of 
Cox‟s works, and how he applies his theoretical framework in the analysis of the 
changing world order. For the theoretical evaluation of the CCT framework, I will 
base conduct a literature review of the works of relevant scholars that have used 
CCT. The evaluation of South Africa‟s influence on Mozambique‟s development 
strategy will be mostly based on secondary sources, such as development reports 
and indicators. The study can therefore be considered to have a descriptive and 
qualitative focus.  
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One of the reasons for choosing CCT as an explanatory framework is that it is a 
dynamic model that incorporates the analysis of interactions at several different 
levels of society, including social forces, forms of states, regional approaches, and 
world orders (Leysens, 2002). The advantage of using a CCT framework in the 
analysis, as opposed to neorealism, is that is goes beyond regarding states as 
unitary actors who interact in a system that lacks central authority. The analysis in 
this framework is change-oriented and attempts to account for how social forces at 
different levels work as catalysts of change. Another strength of CCT that separates 
it from other strands of critical theory (linked with Ashley, 1984; Linklater, 1998; and 
Neufeld, 1995) is that it is more influenced by Gramscian thought and goes further 
in explaining the power of knowledge and ideas in shaping society. This is of 
particular interest because it provides us with a better explanatory framework to 
understand the role of middle powers in the developing world.  
The unit of analysis in this text will mainly be social forces on the domestic and 
regional scale, but it will also include a consideration of how world order forces have 
affected the development strategy in Mozambique. Although there will be an analysis 
of how the world order has influenced Mozambique since its independence in 1975, 
the main focus of the study will be on the time period after the first elections in 
Mozambique in 1994. This time period is of particular interest because of the 
increased attention that was directed at Mozambique by the international 
community.  
1.6 Chapter Outline: 
In this chapter I have introduced the study through identifying the contemporary 
context in which it will be conducted and have stated the research question that will 
be examined in the rest of this text. I have also commented on my motivation and 
objectives with this study and described how I will attempt to answer the research 
question. Chapter 2 discusses IPE in Africa and how the choice of theoretical 
approach has fundamental implications for the study. The chapter will then evaluate 
Cox‟s conception of power and how this affects the configuration of social forces. 
Finally the chapter will assess the usefulness of middle power theory and discuss its 
added value in relation to CCT. 
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Once the core theoretical framework has been established, Chapter 3 evaluates the 
application of this theory through, first, examining how Cox used it to describe the 
evolving world order, and second, analysing how other scholars have used it to 
describe political economic relations in Africa. By doing so, I hope to be able to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of CCT and to improve the understanding of 
the different points of entry that it offers. This will be important for the case study in 
Chapter 4, which will examine how various social forces have influenced the 
Mozambican development strategy. Based on the findings generated in these 
chapters, the final chapter will seek to draw some conclusions from the study and to 
discuss the implications of these findings, particularly with reference to future 
research on the field.  
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Chapter 2 
 Interests, Theories, and World Order 
 
This chapter will evaluate the relationship between theory and interests and its 
implications for IPE theory. This will be done through examining the challenge that 
critical theorists have posted to some of the main schools within the field. More 
precisely, how their epistemological choices reflect fundamental differences in the 
perception of theory. I will use the debate raised by African scholars concerning the 
inaccuracy of realist theory in describing the African context to illustrate the need to 
understand the function of theory in order to challenge certain groups, both in 
theory and in practice. From this point of view, I will discuss how Cox‟s method of 
understanding change represents a challenge to a highly entrenched ontology within 
the mainstream schools of IR, namely, the fundamental assumption of the sovereign 
state. Rather than discussing this concept as something fixed Cox focuses on how 
forms of states are shaped by pressure from above (world order) and from below 
(social forces related to production). There will be continuous references to the case 
study of Mozambique to illustrate these concepts. Finally, I will evaluate how Cox‟s 
method of understanding the social dynamics of the state can add a level of 
complexity to middle power theory, which makes it a more useful tool in analysing 
the behaviour and interests of middle sized states in IR. 
2.1 Applying critical theory 
For many scholars, Africa has remained a continent that does not seem to follow the 
same rational line of thought that has been firmly established within the „developed‟ 
part of the world. Images describing the African continent as an area which follows it 
own logic, where tribalism has remained strong and modern development still 
remains a distant hope, are firmly embedded in both scholarly texts as well as within 
the „western‟ media. Dunn (2001) describes how these images have been firmly 
entrenched in the minds of people as well as policy makers, which, in turn, have 
resulted in a vast ignorance of the continent and a failure to make sense of many of 
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the events that have taken place there. This has been most evident in the global 
response to some of the tragic events that took place in different parts of Africa 
during the 1990s and there seem to be a growing perception that „Africa does not 
have meaningful politics, only humanitarian disasters‟ (Dunn, 2001:1). This 
perception has in turn limited Africa‟s influence in global politics to humanitarian aid 
and conflict resolution, and the areas where neihter of these issues have been 
relevant have been largely neglected. Ankomah (2008) argues that within most 
international forums, there has been a tendency to treat Africa as a place of human 
suffering and grave injustice, rather than a stage for serious politics.  
The marginalisation of the African states also applies to the field of IPE theory. Dunn 
(2001) makes the point that within the top American universities, more attention is 
paid to Antarctica than to the African continent. This is particularly noticable within 
the mainstream schools of IR, where nearly all major scholars are focused on the 
role of the powerful states in the international arena. Waltz (1979) has argued that 
the focus of IR should be on behaviour of the great states and that it would be 
ridiculous to construct theories of international politics on the Third World or on 
smaller states like Malaysia or Costa Rica. The logic underlying of this argument is 
that it is the actions of the powerful states that shape the global order and that 
states that are not powerful enough to have a direct effect on this order, do need to 
be taken into consideration.  
Murphy (2001) argues that because there has been a lack of attention in describing 
the African context, the conceptual tool within the most established traditions of IPE 
are largely inaccurate in their description of the African reality. As a consequence, 
Murphy argues that Northern states have failed to understand the dynamics of 
relations in Africa, which, in turn, could be part of the reason why the international 
community has failed to deal with some of the issues that have troubled the 
continent.  
Over the last ten years, the continued marginalisation of Africa has become one of 
the major issues debated by African scholars. The focal point of this discussion has 
been on how to develop IR theory that is suitable for the African context and how to 
increase the attention of IR theorists on the continent. One of the most well known 
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critiques, brought forward in Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw‟s (2001) volume 
Africa‟s Challenge to International Relations Theory, argues that the central concepts 
that are developed within the field of IR are not suitable for the analysis of IR in 
Africa, and that these have to be addressed in order to apply IR theory to cases in 
the region in a meaningful way. It argues that concepts in “traditional IR”, such as 
anarchy, sovereignty, the state, the market and the international-domestic 
dichotomy, become problematic when applied in this context. A large proportion of 
the text is focused on attempting to come up with examples of how “traditional IR” 
fails to apply to the African context. Malaquias (2001) argues that because African 
states have not matured, they are therefore not suitable as the only measure of 
analysis. Instead he argues that one needs to examine the behaviour and influence 
of sub-actors to understand state behaviour, both domestically and externally. A 
further point made by Van der Westhuizen (2001) debates the notion of power in IR 
and describes how states use a marketing (branding) strategy in order to gain 
competitive power in the global economy. By doing so Van der Westhuizen appeals 
to a different notion of power than what is described in the realist tradition. In this 
way, these scholars challenge conceptions, such as the notion of state and power, 
and attempt to illustrate how these notions need to be altered to fit the African 
context.  
I believe that the critique of the failure of certain schools to address the African 
context is to some extent accurate. The number of insecurities that trouble the 
continent calls for far greater scholarly attention and there is need approach the 
area with far greater nuance than could be traced from the work of many of the 
most well read scholars. In this line of argument, Dunn‟s (2001) critique of 
Huntington‟s approach in the Clash of Civilizations (1996) is important and one 
should rightly question whether such notions of “Africa” exist and what it actually 
looks like. By collapsing thousands of cultures and into a totalized African civilization 
Huntington makes generalisations that paint a very peculiar picture of Africa. While 
this image has a great impact on people and policy makers around the world, there 
are many African scholars have large objections to its accuracy (Ankomah, 2008). An 
example that illustrates the inaccuracy of this notion of Africa is its failure to account 
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for the vastly different realities in the hugely modern African cities, compared to the 
contrasting traditional and undeveloped rural areas. The divisions between the urban 
and the rural in Africa can in many cases be much more significant than the North 
and South divisions that many scholars refer to within IR theory. However, the way 
in which the Huntington makes these generalisations in his article raises important 
questions that go into the heart of the debate concerning the value of theorising. 
This issue will be explored further below.  
On the other hand, the shape that the critique takes in Dunn and Shaw‟s volume is 
somewhat problematic in itself. One point that Brown (2006) correctly points out is 
that the points made by Dunn and Shaw are inaccurate in addressing „traditional‟ or 
„Western‟ IR as a field of study. Such a critique would be under the assumption that 
there is a unified body of work that can be labelled „Western IR theory‟. Brown 
argues that their challenge is rather directed at concepts that are central to the 
neorealist school of thought and treating it as “traditional Western IR” to some 
extent legitimises neorealism‟s hegemonic claims within the discipline. In this way 
the critique presented in Africa‟s challenge to International Relations helps maintain 
the scholarly focus within IR on the neorealist debate and thereby also maintains the 
importance of the concepts that are central in that tradition. More fundamentally, 
however, Dunn and Shaw‟s volume fails to deal with epistemological questions that 
are of great importance to the validity of their argument. In the section below, I will 
evaluate the role of theory and examine the challenges posed by critical theorists to 
the research programs that are widely accepted within neorealist traditions and 
discuss the implications that epistemological choices have for the way in which 
theory can offer an alternative explanation to the same social issues and structures. 
2.2 Moving beyond problem solving IR theory 
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the debate within IR was dominated 
by a positivist influence on how to gather evidence. Smith describes how this 
influence became regarded by many scholars to be the „gold standard‟ that defined 
the parameters for how research within the field should be structured (as cited in 
Devetak, 2005:143). This had large ontological and epistemological implications for 
the development of IR as a discipline where much of the research attempted to 
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mirror the natural sciences in the establishment of their research programs. These 
sciences were based on a belief in the necessity of strict separation between the 
subject and the object of the observation and therefore a conception of theory 
where the theorist is completely removed from the object of analysis (Devetak, 
2005:144). In practice this meant that researchers needed to stay objective in 
relation to subjects and their role was limited to describe them as accurately as 
possible.  The underlying assumption for the positivist point of analysis is that there 
is a external world „out there‟, and that the role of the sciences is to describe it 
objectively, leaving behind any ideological believes, values or opinions that could 
distort the picture of reality. In this line of thought, good theory should always aim 
to be value free. The positivist influence has had a particularly strong influence 
within the realist discipline and research program, and is highly apparent in Waltz‟s 
(1979) work on structural realism, where he constructs a very abstract model of 
state behaviour, which aims to be universal in application, disregarding the context 
of space and time. 
The notion of value free theory is something that has been focused on within the 
Frankfurt school of critical theory and the work of Horkheimer in the late inter-war 
period. In his work, Horkheimer evaluates the relationship between knowledge and 
interests and describes how knowledge cannot be independent of our existence, but 
rather that it is integral in our social relations and therefore has a social function (in 
Hoffman, 1987). In this context, social function could be interpreted to imply that 
the way in which theory used has practical implications for the social relationships 
within society. Hoffman (1987:233) explains the critical theorist critique of realism as 
describing the world and deriving rationalities and conclusions that completely lack „a 
self-reflective application of reason‟. For critical theorists it is vital to reflect on how 
this reason is established and how the perceptions of the researcher influences the 
way in which they interpret this reason.  Hoffman goes as far as suggesting that the 
neglect of reflection is not just a lack of interest in developing the “human potential”, 
but that it was actually enhancing the capacity for manipulation and control which 
impeded the realisation of the “human potential”. The use of the term of “human 
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potential” in this case refers to exploring the subjective nature of the dominating 
rational amongst people and scholars.   
Since the development of the discipline, one of the most central characteristics of 
critical theory has been to break down the rationale within international relations 
that is considered to be a given for positivists. It has been a central purpose of 
critical theorists to deconstruct these self-evident truths and expose the areas of 
theories that are used to prohibit the autonomy of the individuals through 
manipulating these rationalisations. Although Cox differentiates himself from the 
Frankfurt school in a variety of aspects, he acclaimed a central position among 
critical theorists by stating that „theory is always for someone and for some purpose‟ 
(Cox 1981:207). Cox argues that the nature of theory will be shaped by a theorist‟s 
„nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of 
a sense of immobility or present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and 
expectations for the future‟ (1981:207). Thus, it would be impossible describe the 
reality of states objectively because the reality that is apparent for the theorist will 
be shaped by the collective actions of human beings in society. In this line of 
argument, there is no such thing as theory in itself, created in a vacuum of interest, 
but rather an interpretation of the theorist, which again is determined by a 
standpoint created in a particular space and time. Within the tradition of critical 
theory, a central feature has been to create an awareness of the role the perspective 
of theorist plays in the formation of theory, and therefore that the readers of theory 
should examine its ideology and attempt to discover its concealed perspectives 
(Hoffman, 1987:232).   
Cox (1981, 1995) differentiates between two types of theories: problem solving 
theory and critical theory. One of the main distinguishing elements between the two 
different categories is the ambitions of the theorist applying them. Cox (1981:208) 
describes how problem solving theory assumes underlying structures in the world to 
be static, thus limiting the role of theory to make these underlying structures work 
„more smoothly by dealing effectively with particular trouble‟. Thus the application of 
problem solving theory is used to find how to fix certain elements that restrain the 
structure from functioning optimally. Because theorists working with problem solving 
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theory do not question the general pattern of institutions and relationships, they are 
left in a situation where dealing with problems can only be done by addressing the 
specific area in which they occur, assuming certain stability within the other spheres 
of the perceived theory. By maintaining such ceteris paribus assumptions problem 
solving theory is able to come up with statements of laws and regularities which 
appear to have general validity. However, Cox (1981) argues that such assumptions 
lead problem solving theory to rest on false premises since the social and political 
order is not fixed. The results that are derived from such a theory would thus be 
compromised and inaccurate.  
On the other hand, Cox (1987:208) explains how critical theory is „directed towards 
an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem solving 
theory accepts as its parameters‟. Instead of limiting the problems within a 
theoretical framework to its separate parts, critical theory attempts to lead towards 
the construction of a more holistic picture and thereby seeks to understand the 
process of change in both sections of the framework as well as in its whole. As 
critical theory increases the scope of study to incorporate the larger structures, it is 
also suited to analyse structural problems within the system and thus be in a 
position to address these structural problems, and rather than its individual parts. 
This will be evident in the case study later in the text, where the problems with the 
Mozambican development strategy will not be limited to analysing problems of 
corruption or aid dependency, but will evaluate the underlying structures that allow 
for these problems to evolve.   
However, Cox‟s critique of problem solving theory goes beyond the problems of 
methodology, and includes an objection to the ideological biases it contains. Cox 
(1981) argues that by treating rationality as a self-evident truth, problem solving 
theory becomes vulnerable to manipulation for serving particular national, sectional, 
or class interests, which are given within a given order. Critical theory, on the other 
hand, values openness in terms of its ambitions to use its analysis and 
understanding of society in order to induce changes to what it perceives as being its 
structural injustices (Hoffman, 1987). Many of the scholars that had a strong 
influence on Cox were also deeply involved in political struggle and used theory to 
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criticise the existing realities of world politics in order to change them (Cox, 
1995:35).  
One example is Giambattista Vico‟s study of the ways that change occur in society, 
in particular on how changes in people‟s perceptions influenced the nature of society 
around them. Vico argued that these institutions are not to be thought of as 
unchanging substances but rather continually changing norms, dependent on their 
collectively perceived role in society (Cox, 1986:242). This argument is based on the 
underlying assumption that institutions are made by people and their role and 
functions are constrained and defined by the general understanding about what their 
tasks and limits should be. Cox (1986:242) describes the nature of the institutions 
and their practices to be understood through the „changing mental processes of their 
makers. There is, in this perspective, an identity of subject and object. The 
objectives in this approach ...are constituted by intersubjective ideas‟. Any change in 
these ideas and perceptions would therefore result in redefining the role and nature 
of the institutions. Examples of such institutions could be the state or social classes, 
whose role is completely dependent on the collective perception of society. By 
influencing perceptions, one would thus be able to alter the function of these 
institutions.  
Critical theory, unlike problem solving theory, does not assume institutions and 
social power as fixed but rather questions the origins of these relations and seeks to 
understand alternatives to the prevailing order. It finds these alternatives through 
evaluating the emergence of rival collective images in society and theorising how 
this could affect future structures. A fundamental assumption within critical theory, 
influenced by Polanyi‟s theories, is that, within a particular order, there will always 
be both coherence and elements of conflict. These points of conflict will give rise to 
alternative structures, which push for structural transformation and a change in 
order (Cox, 1995). The objective of critical theory is to find these rival structures and 
include them into the analysis, and in this way be in a position to choose from the 
best alternative amongst them. 
To understand why Africa has become marginalised in both the theoretical and 
political arena, one has to attempt to identify the ideological values that underlie the 
21 
 
dominating schools of thought in IPE. In the following sections of the chapter I 
contend that it is necessary to go beyond the critique presented in Dunn and Shaw‟s 
(2001) volume to address the structural problems that maintain the present order 
and map out potential change. I argue that one has to evaluate the forces that 
preserve the current structures of power in order to evaluate the alternatives to 
these structures, thus placing oneself in a position to choose the best alternative 
amongst them. This will be done through an examination of how Cox, through his 
method of historical structures, attempts to create a framework which addresses the 
structural elements of theory and how this affects his ontological choices within his 
research program. 
2.3 Method of historical structures 
By criticising the positivist influenced research program that has been developed 
within neorealism, Cox (1981) develops a method of historical structures where he 
approaches the study of the structures of world order by incorporating both the 
static and dynamic aspects of the structure. This means that he makes use of both 
historicist and positivist epistemologies within the parameters of his studies in 
different instances. The method of historical structures therefore includes two major 
moments. The first is that of a synchronic understanding. This way of analysing 
historical structures is strongly influenced by Weber‟s method of ideal types, which 
creates concepts that are abstracted from the ideal characteristics of real 
phenomena. Sinclair (1996:10) explains how Cox‟s analysis „specifies the core 
relationships and the parameters of the object in question in a systemic way before 
other considerations take place‟. In order to analyse these relationships in this way, 
Cox looks at snapshots of history, thereby theoretically fixing a particular social 
practice so it can be compared with other social practises. Ideal types thus become a 
way of representing an a-historic view of historical structures similar to that of 
problem solving theory. What separates them is that Cox contains these views in the 
form of identifiable ideologies and parts of a larger context rather than as guides to 
action. The synchronic analysis becomes an important part in assessing the points of 
conflict within the respective structure.  
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The second movement takes a more holistic approach in that it evaluates these 
points of contradiction and conflict in terms of how they evolve throughout a 
historical situation rather than from the abstract models of world order. This way of 
diachronically analysing situations is highly important for the analyses because it can 
account of the process of structural change within different historical timeframes. 
Cox (2002:32) describes how his analyses of production is strongly influenced by 
Braudel‟s description of different time dimensions, where the movement of history is 
conceived as taking place at different levels. He describes how the immediate 
events, such as things that are being recorded by the media, can be categorised as 
l‟histoire événementielle (events history). The medium term, which creates a context 
in which events take place, such as business cycles or patterns of social 
organisation, is conceptualised by Braudel as „conjunctional history‟. These two 
levels of historical analysis are in turn conditioned by the longue durée (enduring 
history), where the structures more resilient to change become collectively perceived 
as the natural order of things. Examples of such structures would be the state 
system or the capitalist mode of production. These will be discussed in more detail 
below, but the essence of the analysis is that to comprehend how Cox‟s historical 
structures influence the global order, it is important to understand how the events 
that take place on a daily basis are conditioned by the events that take place in the 
medium run, which again is dependent on longer structures that underline society. 
The method of historical structures has made a significant contribution to the study 
of IR by creating a way of shifting the analysis away from the static understanding 
of relations to incorporating the historical context in which these relationships 
evolve.  
2.4 Production and power 
To establish his ontology, Cox begins by evaluating the significance of the 
production of material life. He describes role of production and states that 
„production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways 
in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects 
of social life, including the polity‟ (Cox, 1987:1). This statement is based on the 
assumption that everything has to have a material basis in order to exist and that 
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the process of production is a fundamental activity for all human groups. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, the control over the production process has major 
implications for the structure of society and is a decisive factor in determining social 
practices, which, according to Cox, evolve as collective human responses to the 
problem of group survival (Sinclair, 1996). From this point of view, Cox can be 
regarded as a historical materialist, on the basis that he analyses the contradictions 
within these groups to explain, as well as promote, changes in social relations. The 
concept of production, for Cox (1987), includes the production of material goods and 
services, ideas, norms, social practices and of institutions. In this way, the concept 
of production has fundamental implications for the ways in which the historical 
structures in society are created.  
From criticising and disaggregating the neorealist ontology within its research 
program in IR, Cox (1981) explains how the establishment of his ontology starts with 
understanding the forces that historical structures are based upon. He describes 
these structures as persistent patterns of human activity that endure for relatively 
long periods of time. Historical structures, according to Cox, consist of a particular 
configuration of forces that have strongly influenced how people perceive their 
surroundings and thus how they act. This influence is not explained to be 
mechanical determination that takes away all agency from the individual, but rather 
puts pressures and constraints on how people regard the world around them. 
Although some people might resist or oppose these pressures, Cox explains that 
they cannot avoid being affected by them to some extent. Later, Cox (1992: 514) 
explains that the historical structures are created through particular historical 
circumstances and that they need to be explained in context of these circumstances. 
He argues that they come into existence as a result of collective responses to certain 
common problems, which are reflected in people‟s ideas, practices and in 
institutions. In this way they become a fundamental influence on society and how it 
is arranged.  
The historical structures, according to Cox (1981), consist largely of three categories 
of forces: material capabilities, ideas and institutions. He stresses that the 
relationship between these forces is not predetermined, but that their relative 
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importance is dependent on the circumstances in which these ideal types are derived 
from (1981:220). The first type of force, material capabilities, captures the dynamic 
interaction between productive capabilities and already accumulated resources. The 
productive capabilities consist of both technological and organisational capabilities, 
which are both central in explaining the possibilities of production in the future. 
Accumulated resources include natural resources, such as oil or minerals, that one 
can transform using the technology. It also includes stocks of equipment, which 
consist of industries and armaments. Finally the accumulated resources include a 
measure of wealth, which determines who controls the production process. As will 
be discussed below, the control of the production process has large implications for 
how the power relation in society is structured.  
The second force that makes up Cox‟s conception of historical structures is ideas, a 
concept that is largely made up of two elements. One kind consists of intersubjective 
meanings, which are collective notions of the nature of social relations, which in turn 
influence how people behave and their expectations of how other actors will behave. 
Cox (1995:33) describes how the structures are pictures of the world that, when 
shared among people, defines reality for them. Since they share these 
intersubjective meanings, their actions and words tend to reproduce this reality.  An 
example of such intersubjective meanings is the monetary system, where individuals 
are taught from childhood that certain coins and notes have a value and can be 
traded for „real‟ things. As this type of idea is deeply entrenched in people‟s 
consciousness, people largely behave according to these ideas and intersubjective 
meanings, which are historically conditioned, thus becoming durable over long 
periods of time. The other kind of ideas that Cox uses in his description of structures 
are collective images of world views that differ according to the social groups. 
Examples of such images would be the legitimacy of the ruling power relations 
within the context of a social group, the influence of religion in determining state 
politics, or the role of ethnicity in determining the distribution of material conditions 
in society.  
What essentially differentiates these different concepts is that whereas 
intersubjective meanings constitute a common ground for social discourse, there are 
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many rival collective images which are specific to competing social forces. The 
differences in the collective images are an important source to understanding 
alternative paths of development and raise awareness of the possibilities of the 
emergence of alternative structures. In chapter four, this distinction will be discussed 
in light of the differences between different groups with respect to how they 
perceive the role of the state in safeguarding the redistribution of resources from the 
expanding private economy.  
The third and final force that the historical structures consist of is institutions. 
Institutions play a central role in stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order on 
several accounts. Cox (1977:351) explains how the major institutions tend to reflect 
the structure of world power as decision makers in the international organisations 
have a picture of the prevailing power relations, which in become the initial 
determinants of the decision making process. He later argues that this influence is 
most noticeable in the initial phases of these institutions, where they encourage 
collective images consistent with prevailing power relations. Eventually, as a 
institution acquires a degree of autonomy they may become a battleground for 
different tendencies (Cox, 1992). The evolving nature of the institutions also 
becomes apparent in the emergence of rivalry between institutions which reflects 
the difference in collective images. This becomes noticeable when structures within 
some of the major international institutions, are in direct contradiction to the 
position of another institution. An example of this is the troublesome relationship 
between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) with respect to the development strategy in some of the 
African countries, where forces in the UNDP have criticised the IMF for its pressure 
for the enforcement of SAPs. However, Cox (1977:364) explains that when a 
particular formal international institution is established, it „crystallizes the hegemonic 
consensus of a particular time in relation to a particular global task or set of global 
tasks‟. Later in the text I will come back to this point in the discussion of how the 
internationalisation of the state in the neoliberal world order has resulted in much of 
state policy being determined by a policy consensus supporting global capitalism as 
a nébuleuse. This consensus is not decided by an authoritative body, but rather 
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evolves from discussions in different bodies of the leading international institutions. 
However, with the emergence of different collective images other than that of the 
dominant order, institutions can become arenas where counter-hegemonic forces 
can fight their battles. This became apparent with the increasing power of the Third 
World countries in the General Assembly of the UN in the late 1970s. However, as 
these countries received symbolic support through collective action in the UN, Cox 
(1992) describes how the dominating powers put less weight to this forum‟s 
decisions. The transformation of the collective images in institutions does not 
necessarily equate to a transformation in the structure.  
2.5 Hegemony and the world order 
The way in which Cox analyses the relationship between these forces in the making 
of structures, is strongly influenced by Gramsci‟s description of hegemonic 
structures. Although Gramsci did not directly contribute to theories within the field of 
IPE, the underlying logic behind his concept of hegemony is derived from reflections 
on the relationship between the state and civil society, and the relationship between 
production and politics and ethics and ideology. Cox (1983) argues that Gramsci‟s 
theories are also applicable in the analysis of international organisations, which 
contains some of the same dynamic social relations. Gramsci studied the 
mechanisms different classes used in order to gain dominance over other classes. He 
found that the nature of the dominance differed between countries, where some 
relied heavily on the use of coercion, while others seemed to maintain power 
through consent of the subordinate groups. Furthermore, Gramsci focused on the 
experiences of the Bolshevik Revolution, which led him to conclude that existence of 
strong civil societies were essential for the maintenance of power (Cox, 1983). This 
followed from the assumption that civil society, connected with the dominant class, 
would develop an intellectual basis for spreading social myths and a common culture 
that would ensure cohesion and identity within the bloc.  
Drawing on Gramsci‟s analyses, Cox attempts to understand how power is 
established and maintained within the international order. To begin, he argues that 
it is important to distinguish between hegemonic and non-hegemonic orders. Cox 
(1983) describes how the condition for what it means to be hegemonic in a world 
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order context is that a group would have to establish and protect a world order 
which is universal in conception. This means that most other states would 
acknowledge and support this order, finding it to be compatible with their interest. 
The establishment of such consensus would thus not be possible with the use of 
force alone, but is dependent on a globally-conceived civil society and a global 
organization of production which creates links between the social classes of the 
countries that are encompassed by it. Cox (1983:172) describes how a „world 
hegemony would have to be expressed in universal norms, institutions and 
mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those 
forces of civil society that act across national boundaries‟. This brings the notion of 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions into the analysis, where hegemony would 
describe a particular combination of these forces.  
What is clear from Cox‟s notion of world hegemony is that a vital element for the 
dominating classes is to gain consent from the subordinate classes through 
spreading intersubjective meanings concerning the structure of the international 
system. Hegemony is thus more than just dominance and becomes an 
intersubjective sharing of behavioural expectations. A leading nation‟s conception of 
the world becomes universalized to the point where its own leaders stand by the 
universalized principles, even when they conflict with their domestic interests. The 
global civil society plays a central function in a hegemonic order. With its organic 
intellectuals, civil society would perform the function of „developing and sustaining 
the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together members of 
a class and of a historic bloc into a common identity‟ (Cox, 1999:168). Since 
intellectuals are connected with different classes, they would often be in conflict, 
where intellectuals connected with the hegemonic class would attempt to build 
societal consensus, intellectuals from the working class would perform similar roles 
in creating new historic blocs through opposing the hegemonic ideology.   
Institutions would also play a vital role in enabling the dominant classes to use 
mechanisms to deal with rival collective images with the minimum use of force. As 
described above, these institutions often function to spread consent for the ideology 
of the dominating class and offers ways of sanctioning actors that do not comply 
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with this consent by non-violent means. In this context it important to stress that if 
the dominant group see their mission as hegemonic and not merely as dictatorial, 
they will have to make concessions that will secure the subordinate‟s 
acknowledgement of their leadership. By making such concessions, they give an 
appearance that their leadership is of general interest, rather than merely serving 
their own benefit. These institutions would thus have to be structured in such a way 
that the vast majority of the members believe it to be in their advantage to maintain 
them. Cox (1983) explains that if rival forces arise, they would often be co-opted 
into these institutions and forced to push for change from within these structures. In 
this way he describes hegemony as a pillow, „it absorbs blows and sooner or later 
the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon‟ (Cox 1983:173).  
Although a dominant class manages to establish consent for their world order among 
a vast majority of actors within the international system, Cox (1981) argue that they 
would have to possess the material capability to be able to punish the weak if they 
think it necessary. In particular, he argues that although there might be a strong 
hegemonic consensus in the core areas, it often becomes weaker in more peripheral 
areas. Even dominant classes who are willing to make concessions with respect to 
the subordinate classes will therefore be challenged by areas that are not well 
integrated into the order. In this way the forces that make up the historical 
structures all play a vital role in the formation of a hegemonic world order. If just 
one of the forces discussed above (material capabilities, ideas and institutions) is not 
developed sufficiently, the power structure will be challenged by rival forces who will 
seek to change the order. In Mozambique this became evident when Frelimo‟s lack 
of hegemonic consensus has resulted in different groups challenging their rule in 
government.  
2.6 A critical approach to world order 
According to Cox (1981:220) the historical structures that are constituted by the 
three forces does not represent the whole world but rather a „particular sphere of 
human activity in its historically located totality‟. He refers to this as a limited 
totality. This description of historical structures contains two elements that need 
further explanation. Firstly, by describing the need to place the historical structures 
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in a „historical located totality‟, Cox goes back to the stasis problem that was 
debated earlier in the context of problem solving theory. He argues it is possible to 
avoid this problem by evaluating and comparing different historical structures in 
related spheres of action (Cox, 1981:220). This can be done through a diachronic 
evaluation of concepts where definitions of a particular structure are derived from a 
study of the historical situation that it relates to and not merely from a static model 
of a social system. To gain an understanding of the composition of forces within a 
particular historical structure, it is therefore important to contextualise this structure 
in terms of the historical process from which it has been derived and then compare 
the structure to other historical structures from similar spheres of action. Finding 
emerging rival structures within that historical context, one can explore alternative 
possibilities of development to that historical structure (Cox 1981).  
Secondly, Cox‟s description implies that the historical structures are limited by their 
particular sphere of human activity. In this world view, Cox describes that the 
historical structures need to be applied at different levels of the social world. He 
identifies three such spheres: social forces, forms of state, and world orders, but 
describes how these are mere suggestions for the purpose of his analysis. These 
spheres of action describe dynamic processes taking place at different levels of 
society.  In a similar way to the forces that make up the historical structures, the 
relationship between these spheres is not fixed, but the spheres‟ relative importance 
will depend on the historical circumstance that is under evaluation. 
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Fig 1. Historical materialism 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between production and the forces that make up 
the historical structures within the different spheres of activity. The figure shows 
that the forces that arise from production (institutions, ideas and material 
capabilities) are combined in different ways to make up different levels of activity. 
The lower level includes examples of elements that these forces can consist of. The 
arrows between the different spheres of forces illustrate that the relationship 
between them is flexible and that they are highly interactive. What takes place at 
one level of activity therefore influences what happens in another. The section below 
further examines the nature of these spheres and through this examination 
discusses some of the concepts that are central in Cox theories such as class, state 
and world order. 
2.7 Spheres of activity 
The first of these spheres of activity, which Cox (1981:220) calls social forces, refers 
to the organization of production and how this shapes the identity of certain groups 
in society and their relation to other groups. In his 1987 volume, Production, Power 
and World Order, Cox describes the relationship between production, social class 
and political power and examines the ways in which these levels influence each 
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other in context of global forces. An important point in this examination is that the 
organisation of production is dependent on how the power over production is 
distributed amongst different groups as well as how control over production 
reinforces the power differences, creating groups in society that are dominant over 
other groups. Thus the process of production generates the capacity to exercise 
power, thereby shaping the structure of society by creating dominant groups which 
can control the organisation of how things are produced. In this way, what has 
already been produced in the past, and how this is distributed, will determine how 
things will be produced in the future. Cox (2002) details how these groups can often 
be characterised through the description of social classes. He argues that the 
structure of production in a particular society gives the basis for its potential class 
structure. In Chapter 4 this will become evident when considering the shift in the 
control of production in Mozambique during the immediate post-colonial period, 
where individuals that came to power quickly developed to form an economic elite 
with a strong class awareness.  
Schechter (2002) explains how Cox‟s central focus on class structure has been 
criticised by different academic schools, such as feminists and post-colonial scholars, 
who argue that his work pays insufficient attention to other identities which are vital 
to understanding the complex compositions of groups in society. Cox (2002) 
responds by describing that the essence of class is social domination and 
subordination, and that it can be expressed in a variety of different ways, such as 
gender, race, ethnic groups and other identities that converge into the production 
process. The inclusion of characteristics other than the socio-economic dimension 
that class normally refers to is therefore possible as the logic behind the way in 
which production influences society remains the same. Further examination of these 
groups in society is therefore important in order to gain an understanding of how 
they are influenced by the production process, but it is unlikely to alter the 
fundamental assumptions that Cox‟s framework is built upon. Although the class 
structure that one finds in Mozambique today differs from the race based divisions 
that were strong during the colonial period, it is possible to compare the two in 
terms of finding dominant and subordinate groups with similar power-relations.   
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In his analysis of the state, Cox questions what he describes as „fictions [that] are 
purported to lie at the basis of the realist state system: the sovereign equality of 
states and the concept of anarchy as postulating the nature of relationships among 
them‟. In this critique, Cox touches upon the fundamental ontological basis of 
neorealism. He explains how upholding the distinction between state and society 
neglects the ways in which states can gather resources to encourage and strengthen 
the behaviour of non-state actors, while social groups can influence state policy in 
these matters (Cox & Jacobson, 1977). Instead he develops a concept of the 
state/society complex, in which he tries to move away from the state versus society 
dichotomy central to the neorealist tradition, and instead examines authoritative 
institutions such as the state in relation to the balance of social power that sustain 
and undermine them (Cox, 2002).  
Through the analysis of the relationship between the state and other social powers, 
Cox finds that the realist account of the sovereign state becomes inaccurate on 
account of internal and external influences. This is strongly influenced by Gramsci‟s 
notion of hegemony that describes how intellectuals in civil society, who are strongly 
connected to the different classes, are building historical blocs which influence the 
collective perception of the nature of the state and the expectations of it (Cox, 
1983).  As the tasks and limits of the state are defined by these collective 
perceptions, the hegemonic classes will have a strong influence on the form of the 
state and its behaviour. The nature of the state will therefore be continuously 
evolving and defined by the war of position and competing collective images.  
External factors will also play a role in compromising the notion of the sovereign 
state. These influences will not only penetrate the state directly, but also through its 
domestic society. An example of this, which will be described in more detail below, is 
the „internationalisation of the state‟ which has taken place within the neoliberal 
global order. This phenomenon describes how different forms of transnational 
networks between states, corporate representatives and intellectuals, work towards 
the formation of policy consensus for capitalism as a nébuleuse (Cox 2002:33). 
Hanlon (2007) describes how donors, big business and the political elite within 
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Frelimo have worked as advocates for a market oriented development policy and 
have limited the discussion of other alternatives.  
In the final sphere of activity, world orders, Cox (1981) describes particular 
configurations of forces that define the power-relationships between states. The 
world order in this regard is a system of historical structures that work as a 
framework within which people, states, companies, organisations or institutions are 
acting. Abrahamsson (2003:14) describes the world order as „a system of rules and 
norms regulating international economic and political cooperation‟. In periods of 
hegemonic relations, Cox (1987) uses the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana as 
examples. These world orders were based on long-term hegemonic values and the 
short-term security interests of the dominating state and its national elite. Without 
describing the world orders during these periods in detail, they reflected the 
international spread of values that were deeply entrenched in Western thinking such 
as nation-state building, private ownership and global market economic principles. 
These principles were shared by elites across borders through leading business 
schools that attract elites from all countries, the international mass media and 
international institutions who endorse the policy guidelines of the nébuleuse. These 
ideas would finally affect countries through „concrete measures of national fiscal and 
monetary policy‟ (Cox, 2002:33). 
To get a fuller representation of a historical process one has to take the relationship 
between these levels into consideration, where each sphere will be seen as 
containing, as well as bearing the impact of, each of the other spheres. In this way 
the three spheres of activity are interrelated. For example a change in the 
organisation of production can generate new social forces that could push for 
change in the function and role of states. Finally the change in the nature of the 
state can alter the structure of the world order (Cox, 1981:220). The relationship 
between these spheres of activity can go both ways and should, according to Cox, 
not be considered to be unilinear. This means that all spheres influence each other 
in ways which are not hierarchical or predetermined.  
Through the method of historical structures, Cox created an innovative research 
program which combines a synchronic description of structures with a diachronic 
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analysis that seeks out contradictions and conflicts within these structures. By 
combining these two elements in his study, Cox avoids the stasis problem that is 
inherent in the research programs of fields of IR that are influenced by the positivist 
form of analysis. We have seen how this has led him to evaluate the ontological 
significance of the production of material life and how the historical structures are 
constituted by the forces created by production. An important point in this section 
has been to emphasise that the analysis of these forces only leads to limited totality, 
and do not incorporate everything. One has to juxtapose this analysis with the 
analysis of other historical structures in related spheres. This is an important point in 
his research program and will be reflected in the later analysis of Mozambique and 
the influence of external actors on the Mozambican development program.  
Chapter three of the text will examine the configuration of forces at different levels 
in the post-Second World War order and evaluate how this affected African 
state/society complexes, particularly after the end of colonialism. Before this 
historical evaluation, I will describe how the emergence of middle power theory can 
be used in conjunction with Cox‟s theory of historical structures to help us in 
understanding of how the South African State.  
2.8 Middle power theory 
As mentioned in the above discussion of realism, much attention within the field of 
IR has been focused on classifying countries according to their power capabilities 
and attempting to find some mechanism of correlation between the size of the state 
and their behaviour within the international system. While there was a tendency in 
the mainstream schools to focus uniquely on the actions of the major powers during 
the era of the Cold War, increasing interest in the behaviour of the smaller powers 
was shown during the last decade of the 20th century. There was a call to increase 
the parameters of the research conducted in IR beyond the study of major states 
and examine „alternative sources of agency in order to more fully capture the 
evolving complexity in global affairs‟ (Cooper, 1997:1). The scholarly interest in the 
concept of middlepowermanship became particularly known through the works of 
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal (1994) in their study of the foreign policy behaviour of 
Canada and Australia. This concept was developed further and with increased scope 
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in Cooper‟s 1997 volume, Niche Diplomacy, which presented a more complex 
argument explaining the behaviour of a larger collection of powers.  
While Cooper, Higgot and Nossal‟s call for more analysis on the role of middle 
powers was taken up by scholars within IR, there was little consensus on how to 
classify these powers within the different research programs. Although Holbraad 
(1984) emphasised that physical attributes were an important factor in 
characterising middle powers, he ultimately argued that our understanding of middle 
powers should consist of a combination of state capacity, position in the world order, 
domestic class interest, and the role and influence of foreign policy makers. More 
precisely, Jordaan (2003:165) describes middle powers as: „states that are neither 
great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and 
demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system‟. 
This can be interpreted to include a measure of physical appearance depending on 
the conception of power, but emphasises that a central feature is that the state 
needs to have influence in the world system that it uses to advance „cohesion and 
stability‟. Central to this perspective is a strong normative bias that middle powers 
act as good multilateralists and international citizens, based on a national will to act 
in a responsible fashion. It contains an inherent ideological conception concerning 
the value of state behaviour, which seems to consist of stabilizing the current order 
and thus perpetuating the balance of power between states.  
Following this line of thought, Cox (1989) argues that far from being committed to 
supporting international institutions on the basis of a conviction of the value of being 
good international citizens, middle powers have a strong interest in establishing a 
stable environment as a condition for the pursuit of goals that exist with different 
groups in society. He describes that middle powers use the stable arena that 
international institutions provide to gather a collective force to push for structures 
they understand to be of their benefit. This would be in support of the major powers 
in a hegemonic order and against them during non-hegemonic orders. Similarly, 
Cooper (1997:7) rejects the notion of good international citizenship as nostalgic 
mythology and points out that despite the claim of moral superiority, neither Canada 
nor Australia has an unblemished record with respect to international issues. He 
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instead argues that middle powers only engage in constructive internationalism 
when this form of activity is in line with their domestic interests. While using a 
state‟s self-less approach to multilateralism would be a difficult measure of middle 
powers, evaluating their role and influence within international institutions could be 
one way of identifying such states.  
This method of conceptualising middle power does, however, maintain a vagueness 
that reduces its descriptive value as an analytical tool within IR. In his response to 
Cooper‟s niche diplomacy, Jordaan (2003) argues that the concept looses a large 
degree of explanatory power on the basis of its failure to accurately describe the 
criteria in the middle powers definition. He argues that this has been particularly 
prominent with the recent inclusion of developing states, such as Brazil, South 
Africa, and Malaysia, which attain features that are not similar to the „traditional‟ 
middle powers. He is not satisfied with the extent to which Cooper separates 
between traditional and emerging middle powers, and attempts to develop these 
concepts further through examining the constitutive differences between them. 
According to Jordaan (2003:171), traditional middle powers are stable social 
democracies with strong egalitarian values. In addition they constitute countries that 
had insecure positions during the Cold War and were powerlessly caught in the 
standoff between the two superpowers. These states are not dominant in their 
geographical region, but maintain a certain distance to the hegemon. He mentions 
that typically countries like Norway, Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands are used 
as examples of such countries. On the other hand, Jordaan describes emerging 
middle powers as recently established democracies, which still contain a large 
number of undemocratic practices. These states are characterised by societies with 
deep social cleavages in terms of class, which often can be traced through ethnical 
lines. These are states that have risen in the post-Cold War period to assume their 
internationalist postures and have superior influence within their regional location.  
The difference between traditional and emerging middle powers also consists of 
differences in behaviour. While traditional middle powers have been largely been in 
support of the hegemonic order within international institutions, the emerging 
middle powers have in some cases been part of counter-hegemonic movements that 
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have been opposed to the market liberal order that has been to the disadvantage of 
Third World states. Jordaan (2003) explains that it is not uncommon for middle 
powers to express a dedication to fundamentally changing the international system 
in favour of marginalised groups. However, he notes that during negotiations with 
the core, they are often far less adamant about comprehensive reforms. This could 
be explained by looking at the way powerful social forces within these states are 
connected with the international economy, while the state is dependent on giving 
the appearance that they are working to the benefit of marginalised groups in order 
to maintain the regional and domestic order. Furthermore, by setting up regional 
institutions, these middle powers can perpetuate the hegemonic consensus and 
position themselves to act as a link between the economies in the core and in the 
periphery.  
One could add a higher degree of sophistication to Jordaan‟s argument by further 
examining the dynamics between the social forces in the different states. The 
organisation of production in emerging middle powers often reflect the way the 
political and economic elite are well integrated into the world economy, while the 
poorer classes are neglected and marginalised, both domestically and within the 
world order. This can be regarded in context of Cox‟s description of the transnational 
managerial classes, where the groups controlling production in some states develop 
common interests and identities with similar groups in other states. Cox (1987:294) 
emphasises how the identity and interests of these groups are further synthesised 
by their strong international presence at arenas such as the grandes école, which 
consists of the top schools and universities around the world. Though socialising in 
these arenas, this group creates powerful networks and participates in spreading an 
intellectual basis for the hegemonic consensus, thus becoming organic intellectuals. 
In Chapter 4, I will describe how relationships between big business in South Africa 
and the ruling elite in Mozambique improved during the 1990s and how this affected 
development policies in both countries.  
As previously discussed in relation to the state/society complex, organic intellectuals 
play a central role in shaping the structure and role of the state by influencing the 
intersubjective ideas in society. In particular, Cox describes (1987:294) how these 
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groups have been capable of creating „national interest‟, thereby transcending 
particular group interests within the overall objectives of a state. One example, 
which will be further explored in Chapter 4, is how organic intellectuals, connected 
with the South African Foundation, were centrally involved in the economic debate in 
the post-apartheid period and used different mechanisms to limit the economic 
debate to market oriented alternatives. In the same way, Jordaan (2003:175) 
describes how „emerging middle powers aim at raising the international profile of 
their countries along with seeking domestic legitimisation by gaining international 
approval for their foreign policy initiatives‟. By gaining international approval for their 
role in the region, the state can use this support to influence the collective images of 
the role of the state among its domestic constituency, as well as in the region. 
International support and attention for the state‟s role as „constructive 
multilateralists‟ can thereby influence people‟s perceptions and, more fundamentally, 
construct a middle power identity within different groups in society.  
So where does this leave us in terms of the discussion of middle powers and their 
role in IR? Although the approach to middle powers as a combination of physical 
characteristics and behaviour, as presented by Cooper (1997) and Jordaan (2003), I 
would argue that what makes middle powers interesting is how they are used by 
various social forces in the creation and maintenance of a historic bloc. In the final 
chapter this will be further explained through an examination of how the ANC 
embraced the potential role of South Africa as a middle power when they came to 
govern, and how international recognition of this role, influenced the collective 
images, both domestically and regionally, of the role of the state.  
2.9 Conclusion  
The central focus in this chapter has been to explore the relationship between 
interest and the act of theorising. This has been a shift away from the positivist „gold 
standard‟ where the role of the researcher is merely to describe the reality as 
objectively as possible. Instead what has been emphasised, with reference to Coxian 
critical theory, is that theorists cannot separate themselves from the context in 
which they conduct their research, and therefore that their theories are influenced 
by their perceptions. In this line of thought, one has to approach theory by critically 
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examining the context in which it is derived in order to understand how it is confined 
by this development. Furthermore, I have examined, in light of the distinction 
between problem solving and critical theory, how certain research programs within 
IR are used to maintain the current order, while others are focused on change 
through finding alternative structures of power. It is in this light that I have 
discussed Cox‟s method for analysing the world order and how he proposes to avoid 
the static problem that he sees as inherent in the positivist approach to theory.  
Within this discussion I have attempted to describe some of the underlying features 
in Cox‟s theory, such as the relationship between power and production, the forces 
that make up the historical structures, the meaning of global hegemony, and the 
concept of limited totalities. Finally, I gave a brief outline of the development of 
middle power theory over the last decade and argued that despite the weaknesses 
that are apparent with the concept, the theory is interesting in terms of how it can 
be used to affect collective images of the role of the state. Although this differs from 
the way this theory is used by Cox (1989) to explain Japan‟s foreign policy 
behaviour, I would argue that it is highly compatible with Cox‟s analysis of the 
state/society complex and can help explain the role of regional powers in Africa.  
I believe that Cox‟s approach to theory has the potential to answer Africa‟s challenge 
to International Relations Theory. Although he never put much emphasis on an in-
depth analysis of the continent, the dynamic nature of his methodology offers 
various levels of analysis the interaction of which is not predetermined. I have 
discussed some of these „entry points‟ with reference to social forces, forms of state 
and the world order, but Cox emphasises that these are merely suggestions rather 
than fixed points. In the following chapters I will use the theoretical framework 
introduced in this chapter to further assess its added value in terms of explaining 
state/society complexes in Africa. This will be done by, first, evaluating how CCT has 
been applied by other scholars, and then by applying it to the case study in Chapter 
4.  
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Chapter 3 
Critical Theory and the Contemporary World Order 
 
From having examined the criticism posed by critical theorists to neorealism and 
seen how Cox established a theoretical framework to avoid these problems, this 
chapter will evaluate the applicability of CCT in explaining world order with a 
particular focus on Africa. By combining the examination of ideal types with studies 
on the establishment of historical blocs, CCT has been used to explain change within 
the international system. In Production, Power, and World order Cox (1987) 
undertakes an extensive historical account on the changing nature of the production 
relations within the last two hundred years, where he debates the relationship 
between a framework of ideal types that he identifies and three different world 
orders. From this study, he discusses the possibilities for change in the current 
structure through examining the contradictions in the order and social groups that 
have been marginalised by it. Although Cox emphases the role of the marginalised 
populations in “Third World” countries in developing counter hegemonic challenges, 
his analysis of these areas are not detailed and are based on generalisations of 
states in very different geographical locations. The empirical examples that are used 
in Cox‟s texts are particularly focused on South American and some Asian examples 
and on societies which are divided according to classical socio-economic class 
structures. Very few examples are derived from the African continent, where the 
political structures and the social lines in which identity is formed complicate the 
classical class orientation. Despite this descriptive shortcoming, a few scholars, such 
as Abrahamsson (1997), Leysens (2002, 2006) and Taylor (2003), have used a CCT 
framework in their analysis of different African countries and made use of the 
different points of entry as described above.  
In order to provide examples on how Cox applies the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous chapter and thereby illustrate the logics behind his 
argument, I will initiate the chapter by examining the way Cox describes the 
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changing world order, from the liberal world order until today. This will also give a 
historical context to the prevailing order and illustrate how power relations today 
constitute a reflection of a changing world order. The discussion of the current world 
order will focus on the development of the Pax Americana in the post-war period 
and how this has been challenged by different forces in the 1970s. From discussing 
the current world order in relation to the theories presented in the previous chapter, 
I will evaluate the application of CCT within the African context. This evaluation will 
include an analysis of the three studies mentioned above and will attempt to 
illustrate how CCT can be used from different points of entry. Furthermore, I will 
discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses in these approaches. This discuss will 
play an important part in shaping the structure of the analysis in Chapter 4.  
3.1 Changes in world order 
In the examination of changes in the world order from a CCT perspective, the 
evolving nature in the balance of power between different actors and the alternation 
between hegemonic and non-hegemonic structure becomes of particular importance. 
In order to understand how changes in the relations between forces in society take 
place, it is important to understand how different mechanisms are used to establish 
power. In the discussion above, the state was outlined as one of the most central 
mechanisms that are used. From acknowledging that the practice and limits of the 
state, or the raison d‟état, is dependent on their historic blocs, Cox (1987) argues 
that one has to examine the ways in which state power is used to determine the 
organisation of production and strategies for modes of development within societies. 
This determination does not necessarily need to happen directly, but could be 
established through fixing the framework of laws, institutions, practices and policies 
affecting production. In this way the state is an agent that can be used to activate 
the potentialities of social transformation or towards maintaining the existing social 
order.  
By following this line of argument, social change should not be regarded as 
something that exogenously „bursts upon‟ states, but rather a transformation that 
happens within the state itself, displacing one form of state with another. The 
changes in production relations are thus strongly influenced by the transformations 
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in the forms of state that take place when a historic bloc is replaced by another and 
thereby a raison d‟état by another (Cox, 1987). Furthermore, Cox develops this 
argument by describing how transformations in forms of state are strongly related to 
the changes in the structures of the world order in a mutually reinforcing manner, 
where the emergence of new forms of state are associated with changes in the 
structure of world order. Thus within CCT, the changes in both forms of state and in 
world order have to be taken into account when explaining changes in production 
relations. One can gain an understanding of a social order by evaluating the 
relationship between the state, the world order and the social relations of production 
relations. 
The study of the three successive structures of world orders in Cox‟s 1987 text is 
examined as a framework for considering transformations in forms of state and 
thereby shifts in the modes of production. The examination of these historical 
reflections help to illustrate the ways in which there is a parallel between changes in 
form of state and world order through describing how the change in structure was 
characterised by the emergence of new forms of state, new historic blocs, and new 
configurations of production relations.  
The first structure of world order is referred to as the liberal international economy, 
roughly dated to 1789-1873 (Cox, 1987:111-150). This order is characterised as 
emerging together with the liberal state, with the establishment of the bourgeois 
hegemony in Britain and of British hegemony in the world economy. In examining 
the liberal state, Cox‟s distinction between the Weberian style analysis of the ideal 
type state and the more historically based approach of the analysis of the historical 
blocs becomes clear. The former would emphasise focusing on the functions of the 
liberal state, thus examining its role as guardian of the market and of the principle of 
private property in the means of production was preserved. The state‟s removal of 
existing obstructions to economic freedom inherited from feudal and mercantilist 
practices, for example, paved the way for production oriented at international trade. 
The latter type of examination evaluates the political struggle through which the 
liberal forms of state came about. Cox (1987:147) describes how this era was 
characterised by non-polarised class conflict in the expansive centre, as the 
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bourgeoisie had ceased its revolutionary tendencies and had gained sufficient 
influence with the ruling regime, while the workers had not yet become a coherent 
challenge. On the level of world order, the liberal order was characterised by a 
hierarchical organisation of states, where Britain was the main trading nation, 
principal source of capital for the rest of the world, principal enforcer of market rules 
and the preserver of military balance. In this way the liberal era permitted both the 
transformation of states towards more liberal forms together with an expansion of 
the world economy in relatively peaceful conditions.  
The transformation from the liberal world order to the era of rival imperialisms, 
dated to 1873-1945, was marked by a change in the relative power of states and the 
end of British hegemony. In terms of the world order, Cox (1987:153) describes that 
by the end of the 19th century there had been a vast spread of industrialisation, and 
that the British industrial and military leadership had been overtaken by a variety of 
different countries. Britain‟s leading position as industrial power was replaced by a 
situation where different industrial powers where competing for influence. Cox 
(1987:154) explains how the competition for power required states to promote their 
own industrial basis by protecting their markets and through an expansionary thrust 
for markets and colonies.  
The industrialisation had brought about fundamental changes in the composition of 
society, which became increasingly reflected through changes in the historic bloc 
and in the nature of the state itself, which was expected to take more initiatives in 
regulating the market and in its provision of services. In this way, Cox (1987:164) 
describes how the liberal state was transformed into the welfare-nationalist state 
where the role of the state, which was under strong influence by the labour unions, 
increasingly became to compensate for the negative effects of the market, such as 
unemployment, occupational injury and old age that people were unable to cope 
with on their own. On the other hand, the major corporations expected the state to 
play a role in developing human resources, through providing education, housing 
and health services. By setting up barriers to trade and providing different types of 
services, the state increased its role in the production of goods and became an 
increasingly important player in the national economies. In his description of the 
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transformation from the liberal world order, Cox provides examples of how the social 
structures described in Chapter 2 can change.  
3.2 The emergence of the neoliberal world order 
The events taking place during the Second World War marked a change in the 
balance of power in the world. The war had greatly reduced the industrial 
capabilities in Europe and shifted the balance of power from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific Rim. The term “superpower” was introduced with the increasing position of 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, separating them from the other major states in the 
system. During the war, particularly the U.S. had built up a large scale war economy 
that was dependent on continuing a huge export surplus in order to be sustained. At 
the same time, Europe actively encouraged the American involvement on the 
continent in both the reconstruction process, but later also in controlling the 
influence of the Soviet Union. In the negotiations that took place after the war, it 
was agreed between European and U.S treasury negotiators on a scheme which 
included an internationally expansionist American economy, while at the same time 
preserving a directing role for the state in the economy (Gill, 2003).  
One of the major fruits of these negotiations was the initiation of the Marshall Plan, 
which the U.S. used to shape the post-war economic order and lead Western Europe 
towards trade liberalization and basic conditions of opening up their economies. The 
plan thus provided the incentive to join the new economic order and provided the 
support for the political establishment of centre-right politics all around Europe. At 
the same time the leftward thrust, which emerged in the immediate post-war years 
with demands of increasing the role of state bodies in economic management, was 
stemmed (Payne, 2003). The heavy U.S. presence around the world, both 
economically and militarily, created large and accumulating balance of payment 
deficits. However, the U.S. public deficit was financed through pressure on European 
and Arab countries to hold large quantities of dollars, thus making them hostages to 
the U.S. foreign policy. Cox (1987:217) describes how the premise of the hegemonic 
order was that the world economy was „a positive game in which some businesses 
and some national economies may benefit more than the others, but in which all 
have the opportunity to gain‟. The Bretton Woods Institutions, which came into 
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effect in the 1950s, became accessories to U.S. policy through securing compliance 
on the part of the more reluctant governments and disabled national economies by 
using both incentives and sanctions.  
3.3 Internationalising production and the state 
There are two characteristics of the neoliberal order that Cox (1987) puts particular 
emphasis on, the internationalising of production and of the state. Firstly, the world 
order was structured in a way that created the conditions for the emergence of a 
world economy of international production within the existing international economy 
of classical trade theory. The difference between international economy and world 
economy model is that where the former focuses on exchange of goods and capital, 
the latter focuses on the distribution of production. The world economy of 
production thus incorporates how transnational production is organised and where 
the different production components are located. As the states lowered the 
restrictions to international trade during the post-war years, the international trade 
expanded, and the international production grew progressively. At the same time 
transnational flow of capital and investment increased, as private business realised 
that they could increased their profits by moving their production to areas with lower 
production costs. In this way the cheap human capital in areas such as Japan, was 
made available to U.S. and European companies.  
Although there was a massive flight of production investment flowing from the most 
developed countries, their control over production remained intact. Cox (1987:244) 
explains that knowledge, either in the form of technology or market information, is 
the „principal resource in the world economy, especially knowledge in its dynamic 
form as the capacity to generate new technologies and to market new products‟. 
Although part of the production is moved to a lower cost location, the control over 
this production is thus sustained by maintaining the more sophisticated parts of 
production and the work that is not directly tied up to production, such as research 
and development, market research and promotion, in the country of origin. In this 
way the power over production remained in the more developed states while they 
were net exporters of production investment.  
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The internationalisation of production had some serious implications for the power 
balance between different social groups in society. Cox (1987:253) describes how 
the overall effect has been to increase the disparities in living conditions between 
workers that are subject to different modes of production. While it has been to the 
benefit of the established skilled workers in the developed state that were employed 
in the core services of international industry, it has weakened the position of the 
worker employed in heavy industries.  As the industrial leaders could move, or 
threaten to move production abroad if the workers did not comply with their 
demands, the trade unions lost much of their bargaining power. In the developing 
countries, where these industries moved, there was an expansion in the enterprise-
labour market, which in turn has encouraged further expansion of the primitive 
labour market through urbanisation. The internationalisation of production has thus 
resulted in increasing the fragmentation of the working classes, where certain 
groups have benefited to a much larger extent than others.  
The other characteristic of the neoliberal world order, the internationalising of the 
state, consists of a global process whereby national policies and practices are 
adjusted to the requirements of the world economy of international production. Cox 
(1987:253) describes how „the reshaping of specific state structures in accordance 
with the overall international political structure is brought about by a combination of 
external pressures (external, that is, to particular countries though arising within the 
overall international political structure) and realignments of internal power relations 
among domestic social groups‟. He explains how this is a process that takes place 
through three steps. Firstly, an interstate consensus regarding the requirements of 
the world economy is developed within a common ideological framework. This refers 
back to the discussion above, concerning the development of an international 
nébuleuse. Secondly, this discussion is hierarchically structured in a way that certain 
actors weigh more than others in the formation of the „consensus‟. Finally, the 
international structure of states is adjusted so that the consensus can be internalised 
in the different states, thus transforming the global consensus into national policy 
and practice. In this context, state structure refers to both the machinery of 
government administration and the historic bloc on which the state rests. The typical 
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features of the internationalisation of the state does not include an abandonment of 
old state departments, but rather that they strengthen the position of the 
departments that act as links between the world economy and the national 
economy, such as finance ministries, treasuries and foreign trade and investment 
agencies (Cox, 1987:228). 
The Bretton Woods institutions were structured to pressure and assist governments 
in making the transition from developing their national economies, to joining the 
world economy. This happened through putting conditionalities on the loans that 
were given, thereby demanding countries to open their economies in order to qualify 
for getting funding, while at the same time giving financial assistance to the same 
governments, enabling them to soften the impact of external economic 
developments. Stigliz (2003) describes how these institutions developed strong 
norms for the functioning of the state and incorporated mechanisms to supervise 
that they were followed. In many cases this mechanism was shaped through 
incentives for governments to harmonise their national policies through the promise 
of external resources. The countries not complying were frozen out of the system, 
which was underlined by President Allende of Chile in his address to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1972:  
„We are not the object of any trade ban. Nobody has said he seeks a 
confrontation with our country. It would seem that our only enemies or 
opponents are the logical internal political ones. That is not the case. We are 
the victims of almost invisible actions, usually concealed with remarks and 
statements that pay lip service to respect for the sovereignty and dignity of 
our country, but we have first-hand knowledge of the great difference that 
there is between those statements and the specific actions we must endure‟ 
(As cited in Cox, 1987:261). 
Allende‟s statement illustrates that although there is an official respect for the 
individual country‟s sovereignty to decide its policies, the countries that do not 
converge to the hegemonic norms become the subject of hostile policies from the 
core. Cox (1987) describes how the foreign backed Chilean coup and assassination 
of Allende in the year following his speech further illustrates how such countries 
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ultimately risk being removed by force if they do not conform to minimum standards 
of correct behaviour according to the hegemonic core.  
The example from Chile shows the relationship between the different forces that 
make up the historical structures as described in Chapter 2. Allende‟s reluctance 
towards accepting the collective images of the hegemonic power would ultimately 
end with the latter using its material capabilities to punish the rival social forces. 
These forces will also be described in the case study of Mozambique, where the 
hegemonic power used institutional mechanisms to deal with a competing ideology.   
3.4 Neoliberalism and statehood 
There are, according to Cox (1987:217-219), principally two different forms of states 
that have developed in the post Second World War period. Within North America and 
Europe, the welfare-nationalist state that was structured to protect the national 
economies from outside influence, was reshaped to seek its security as a member of 
a stable alliance system and through integration in the world economy. Although this 
type of state contained some of the features of the liberal state, which was 
described above, it maintained some of its influence in the economy. After having 
experienced the Great Depression in the interwar period, the perceived role of the 
state in adjusting for business cycles and market imperfections persisted. Firstly, by 
assisting the private industries in various ways, such as through subsidies and tax 
abatements, the state continued to play a direct role in the accumulation process. 
Secondly, the state was expected to protect different social groups that were 
threatened by the coercive forces of the market, particularly when they had political 
connections, such as farmers, certain types of labour or unemployed. Finally the 
perception of the nature of the market as a place of equal actors changed to 
incorporate the actors of different nature, such as state owned business coexisting 
with a competitive sector of smaller businesses. Importantly, the state expenditure 
was expected to be connected with an overall fiscal policy that was aiming at 
counteracting the negative growth cycles,  thus regulating the market for a more 
even economic growth.  
The role of the state in the economy thus had large similarities with the welfare-
nationalist state. However, an important difference between them was their political 
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focus, where the welfare-nationalist state sought to protect its autonomous economy 
within its borders, the neoliberal state flourished in spreading throughout the world 
economy. As mentioned above, the Bretton Woods Institutions were constructed to 
smooth out the international effects of this approach and synchronise states‟ policies 
to avoid discrimination between states. However, the internationalisation of 
production created a high level of class conflict in society, as the effects were 
unevenly distributed among different groups as described above. The governments, 
who had been part of the tripartite arrangements between managers and the 
unions, tended to increasingly focus on the need to maintain competiveness and 
therefore facilitate for the business elite. Cox (1987:228) explains how these 
governments often developed a two-tier structure in their relations with industry, 
which describes how the state took part in both informal and formal corporatism. 
The formal structures of corporatism refer to the connections between different 
ministries in the government with business trade associations and trade unions. The 
informal structure incorporates a different level of contact between individuals 
associated with the upper levels of public administration and the management of big 
enterprises. This type of interaction relates to the creation of a nebelusé as 
described in Chapter 2, that grew out of informal networks of, for example, 
graduates of the grande écoles who came to occupy high-level positions in industry 
and state administration. The close connections between government and business 
in this two-tier structure have resulted in further diminishing worker union‟s 
influence in determining politics at the upper levels.  
3.5 The neo-mercantilist state 
In order to capture the nature of states outside North America and Western Europe, 
Cox (1987:230) develops an ideal type of state which he refers to as the neo-
mercantilist development state. These are described as being developments from 
protostates, which are states where the political authority does not have the consent 
or the capacity to form effective economic policies, and the national market does not 
contain sufficient demand to become an effective force on its own. The 
neomercantilist states developed beyond this point, as state power induced changes 
in both economy and society with the goal of gaining control over the instruments 
50 
 
necessary to shape the national economy. Examples of such changes would be 
increasing the regulation of foreign access to minerals or their ability to set up 
manufacturing production. These states may be developmentalist, as they attempt 
to use this control in order to achieve continuous growth and development. Cox 
(1987) describes how these states are often characterised by a high level of foreign 
economic penetration, where external companies seeks to exploit the resources of 
the state, either natural or human, in their  production. With the aim of maximising 
its share of benefits from the world economic structure, the neo-mercantilist states 
often encourage such behaviour as they can extract rent from the production, which 
could far exceed the revenue they receive from general taxation. The economies of 
such states are often characterised by non-established and unskilled labour that is 
employed by foreign corporations, an enterprise labour market that is involved in 
small-scale businesses, and a growing primitive labour market of those displaced 
from the rural modes, created by the declining subsistence agriculture.  
According to Cox (1987:140) the political leadership structure in neo-mercantilist 
states range from populist movements who base their power on making payoffs to 
the social groups on which it most depended, to caesarism, which is based on a 
military-bureaucratic leadership, which builds its legitimacy from the maintenance of 
law and order among the population, especially in the urban areas. The neo-
mercantilist state thus often contains non-hegemonic orders, whose stability is 
dependent on the influx of foreign revenues, either through loans, aid or rents from 
exports. Any discontinuance of such revenue would reduce their ability to fend off 
the threat of revolt from the dissatisfied, and thus lead to regime change. Such 
states would therefore only be stable to the degree they could finance its repressive 
apparatus.  
As described above, Cox based a high proportion of his examples on Latin-American 
and Asian (including the Middle East) to illustrate the characteristics of the neo-
mercantilist state. One of the main features in the case study in Chapter 4 is to 
evaluate how the Mozambican social structures transformed from the colonial 
structure to a structure that contains many of the features of the neo-mercantilist 
state. What will be apparent, however, is that Mozambique‟s proximity to colonialism 
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still has a strong influence on the development of social forces, in particular on the 
structure of the political and economic elite.  
3.6 Crisis in hegemony 
The neoliberal world order with strong leadership from Washington reached a 
turning point by the middle of the 1970s. The economic conditions changed and the 
post-war consensus based on the Keynesian principles of state intervention in the 
market was questioned. Gill (2003) describes how increasing stagflation together 
with a decline in productivity in the capitalist states led to demands for reform by an 
increasingly powerful transnational ruling class aimed at breaking the power of 
organised labour. At the same time a series of developing countries known as the 
Non-Aligned countries came together and formed a demand for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). More specifically the NIEO includes a series of specific 
demands embodied in a range of official documents adopted by international 
conferences as well as a negotiation process between countries in the Non-Aligned 
movement and the developed countries. Its basic concern was with the 
reconsideration of the basic structure of world economic relations and of the form of 
knowledge appropriate to understand these issues (Cox, 1979). In this way the 
NIEO challenged the hegemonic order on both a structural and intellectual basis.  
The result of the struggle between these different forces was a return to conditions 
similar to those of the liberal world order in the 19th century, centred around an 
idealised notion of the market „in which progress is defined in terms of the 
subordination of labour to capital [while] the state role is limited to a Lockean night 
watch‟ (Van der Pijl in Taylor, 2003:26). Taylor (2003) describes the neoliberalist 
ideology, which became more established from the early 1980s, as a hyper-liberal 
power formation that goes beyond the principles of classical economics as presented 
by Adam Smith. He explains that the main point of the neoliberal project is to reflect 
the rule of the market and maximise growth through facilitating for the unfettered 
private enterprises and deregulation of the economy. Redistribution to the less 
advantaged would thus depend on the trickle-down effect in the economy.  The 
state role in such an order is marginalised through the separation of “politics” from 
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“economics”, thereby putting strong limitations to the sphere of action in which the 
state can operate.  
Throughout the past decade there have been increasing signs of a further 
weakening of the neoliberal order. Most recently this has been illustrated through 
the breakdown of the Doha trade negotiations within the WTO, where the role of 
developing countries such as China and India have become much more independent 
from the positions posed by Europe and North America. Furthermore the debate on 
the global response to the financial crisis has strengthened the developing countries 
demands for restructuring the global financial architecture, mostly through 
increasing their representation in the BWIs.  
One effect of reduced American hegemony, particularly noticeable after the end of 
the global bipolarity, has been the rise of regionalism as a world-wide phenomenon. 
The nature of these regions depend on the areas that are analysed, but as Hettne 
and Soederbaum (2000) point out, there is a tendency in today‟s regionalism to be 
extroverted rather than introverted, reflecting the deeper interdependence on the 
current global political economy and the intriguing relationship between globalisation 
and regionalisation. The changing nature of the region in Southern Africa will be a 
central feature in the analysis in Chapter 4, and particularly Mozambique‟s proximity 
to the regional hegemony, South Africa, will be described to have a strong effect on 
their development strategy.  
3.7 Understanding world order 
So far the chapter has examined the way in which Cox has used his theoretical 
framework to describe the evolving world orders and how this has reflected in the 
form of state, social forces and historic blocs. The analysis has been focused mainly 
on the relations that have taken place in the developed countries, and although Cox 
develops an ideal type state to describe the developing world, there is not much 
analysis that is directed at the African context. The remaining part of the chapter will 
examine the extent to which CCT is useful in analysing African state-society 
relations, and how they are inserted into the international system via the work of a 
number of scholars who have attempted to do so.  
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One way that CCT has been applied to the African context is by using it to analyse 
the North-South relationship and the effects of globalisation on the developing 
world. In his study of the world order in relation to Southern Africa, Abrahamsson 
(1997:1) critically evaluates the links between the „political economy of the world 
order, unequal development and increasing gaps between the rich and the poor 
countries, and the problems of survival, security, governance and legitimacy‟ within 
the various countries. Through combining his understanding of the CCT framework 
with his experience from working with aid programs at a grass root level in 
Mozambique, Abrahamsson provides a detailed and insightful study of the dynamics 
of external and internal influences in shaping the power balance between different 
actors in Mozambique.  
Another point that makes Abrahamsson‟s work particularly interesting, is the way in 
which he combines field work from Mozambique with studies, mostly through 
interviews, within various government branches in the U.S. He describes how he 
went to Washington D.C. expecting to encounter arrogant and, at best, ignorant 
attitudes concerning American foreign policy towards Africa. Instead Abrahamsson 
explains how, on the contrary, he was met with a broadmindedness and self-
criticism that reflected more a feeling of powerlessness than a grand scheme to gain 
political power. In this way Abrahamsson addresses one of the major weaknesses of 
CCT, as the framework is vulnerable to criticism of being speculative in terms of the 
motivation behind the hegemonic actions. There are many examples of scholars that 
do not explicitly make clear on what they base their assumptions. One example can 
be taken from the way Cox (1983:168), inspired by Gramsci, speculates on the role 
that organic intellectuals play in creating collective images among different groups 
and to what extent these individuals are reflective of their role. It is difficult to 
assess whether theory is being consciously manipulated or if it is merely the 
perspective of the individuals that are different, thus unconsciously reflecting in their 
theory. From Cox‟s text it is unclear if there is historical evidence beyond the rhetoric 
in the argument. Also in the description of his research, Abrahamsson reflects on his 
perspective as a researcher and confronts the reader with his views on world order 
and change and thus assists the reader in reading his text critically.  
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In accordance with Cox‟s approach to research, Abrahamsson (2003) emphasises 
the need to take a holistic approach in the application of critical theory. This is 
reflected in his scope of research where he attempts to recognise not only the 
vertical, but also horizontal relations that are relevant in terms of influence on the 
social structures. The vertical relations refer to the hierarchical structure of power 
relations between the different social groups in the international order. On the other 
hand, the horizontal relations are used to capture the cobweb of societal relations, 
particularly on issues like social trust and cohesion where the question of legitimacy 
becomes fundamental. The separation of these types of relations is reflected in 
Abrahamsson‟s study where he first examines the global power structures in terms 
of the American hegemonic influence in the region and its effect on development. 
This is done by first evaluating the interest and the role that the U.S. played in the 
region, particularly in terms of its initiative towards reducing the communist 
influence and its conflicting relationship with the apartheid regime in South Africa 
through its “constructive engagement” policy. Abrahamsson then moves his focus 
onto how the world order affects Mozambique and discusses the way in which 
Washington used various means, such as food aid and support for membership in 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, in exchange for support for its policies in Southern 
Africa. The relations can be considered vertical to the extent they describe the 
hierarchical way that influence spread from the hegemon to the periphery.  
From this point of departure, Abrahamsson (1997) examines how the Mozambican 
development strategy failed in achieving its stated goals of bringing significant 
change for the Mozambican people. The reason for this failure, according to 
Abrahamsson, is essentially that there was too little emphasis on understanding the 
colonial heritage in Mozambique, and that the structural adjustment programs failed 
to take a holistic point of view beyond the standard prescribed medicine of macro-
economic stability. This is where the study of horizontal relationships comes in as 
Abrahamsson puts considerable emphasis on explaining how the structure of the 
Mozambican state and society reacted to the external influences. In particular, he 
examines how the BWIs, which played a major part in structuring the Mozambican 
development program, mainly emphasised the role of privatisation, liberalisation and 
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market forces to achieve their development ambitions. Furthermore, Abrahamsson 
describes how the subsequent reductions in government spending together with a 
cap on external capital inflows to the country created a situation where the 
government was unable to reconstruct the infrastructure that was destroyed during 
the war and limited the amount of private agricultural and industrial investment, 
which led to the rural areas being heavily undercapitalised.  
The discussion on external intervention in the formation of the Mozambican 
development program and its consequences marks the strength of Abrahamsson‟s 
study. On the one hand, Abrahamsson uses CCT to evaluate the Mozambican state 
in terms of the ideal types that Cox develops, and describes how, despite the lack of 
hegemonic relations, the domestic elite has maintained power through using the 
flow of aid to limit the movement for progressive movements. On the other hand, 
Abrahamsson goes beyond Cox‟s framework and incorporates a variety of different 
works (Nilsson, 1998; Hydén, 1980, Putnam, 1993)1 in order to explain the 
mobilisation of various social forces around the country. This is particularly important 
because Abrahamsson shows the flexibility of CCT by combining it with other 
theories, thus illustrating how the logic behind its point of departure is compatible 
with other theories.  
There are, however, some negative elements concerning Abrahamsson‟s application 
of CCT in Southern Africa that require further attention. Firstly, there seems to be a 
gap between his account of how the prevailing world order impacts on Mozambique 
and his discussion of the issues at hand in the domestic sphere. This is particularly 
clear in the description of the bargaining process that took place between 
Mozambique and the U.S., where he notes that: „the strong need for membership 
[in] the Bretton Woods institutions for getting political and diplomatic support from 
the U.S. to stop South African destabilisation, considerably reduced Mozambique‟s 
leverage in the negotiations regarding the design, scope and timing of the Structural 
Adjustment Program‟ (Abrahamsson, 1997:223). However, while he describes how 
the Mozambican government were overpowered in the formation of the program, he 
                                        
1 Particularly Nilsson‟s (1998) study on politicisation of ethnicity, Hydén‟s (1980) argument on how 
economic action can be affected by social considerations, and Putnam‟s (1993) theory on 
democratisation and the development of civil society.  
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later makes the point that „the Mozambican government‟s strong commitment to the 
implementation of the structural adjustment program is evident. In some instances 
the government moves faster than the conditionality prescribes‟ (Abrahamsson, 
1997:229). The only reasoning behind the government‟s enthusiasm for the 
programs is based on the flow of aid and resources that followed. However, going 
beyond the required scope of implementation would not imply an increase in 
resources, and he therefore fails to explain why the government would endorse such 
policies. Throughout his text, Abrahamsson gives little attention to the role ideology 
plays in shaping the world order. By including an analysis of the ideological 
penetration of the neoliberal market oriented development approach, one might be 
able to increase the explanatory value of these observations.  
Another issue concerning Abrahamsson‟s work that needs to be pointed out is the 
choice of actors that he decides to include in his analysis. With regard to the world 
order his focus is nearly exclusively on the role of the U.S. government as the 
hegemonic power. As will be described in Chapter 4, South African actors have been 
a strong influence in affecting the Mozambican policies. Furthermore, the donor 
community, where the Nordic countries have been central, have been another social 
force in Mozambique that should be taken into account.  Also the discussion on the 
conflicting interests between domestic forces is limited by the scope in the study. In 
the discussion on the struggle between the emerging urban bourgeoisie and the 
marginalised rural peasantry, Abrahamsson does not include social forces that could 
work as a catalyst for change into the analysis. A further investigation of potential 
counter-hegemonic movements could therefore be interesting in terms of 
understanding alternatives to the current structure of the market oriented policies.  
3.8 Understanding social forces within the state 
An alternative approach of applying CCT to gain an understanding of social issues in 
a Third World context is to evaluate how the different forces work at the state level. 
As discussed in more detail above, the state itself can become an arena for the war 
of position between different groups, where the intellectuals connected to civil 
society influence the state on a variety of different levels (Cox, 1983). Taylor (2003) 
examines the contradictions and ambiguities in post-apartheid South African foreign 
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policy in an attempt to account for the way that the different forces, both internal 
and external, manifest themselves in the formation of policy. He describes how 
policymakers within the African National Congress (ANC) have promoted issues for 
two separating, and at times conflicting, groups: it‟s Left popular constituency and 
groups that are connected with both domestic and international capital. What is 
particularly interesting about this study is that it captures an account of the various 
venues that different social groups use to influence the nature and the policies of the 
state, and thereby how the state becomes an important apparatus in the 
establishment of a historic bloc.  
One of Taylor‟s core arguments is that the political elite in South Africa has become 
increasingly integrated into „a nascent historic bloc, which more and more reflects 
the concerns, aspirations and demands of a transnational class elite‟ (2003:1). 
Furthermore he argues that this integration has taken place in the context of the 
neoliberal hegemony that characterises the world order, and that the government‟s 
policies have largely reflected their acknowledgement of the neoliberal norms 
associated with a market oriented state. This ideological evolution in the ANC‟s can 
be clearly illustrated by examining the development in their policies from before the 
elections in 1994, which emphasised a strong state role in shaping the economy, 
and the underlying policies in their 1996 economic strategy referred to as: Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which strongly emphasised the free market 
discourse (Terreblanche, 2003).  
An interesting feature of Taylor‟s study is the description of how the ANC elite, 
despite having entered the ranks of what he terms „the transnational elite‟, have 
justified the liberalising of their policies by establishing this ideology as common 
sense and maintaining a position that there are no alternatives to this line of policy. 
The responsibility of the negative consequences is thus pushed from the state to the 
international structure. In order to convince its domestic allies to the Left that it has 
not caved in to the pressures of the global neoliberal agenda, the government has 
become heavily involved in different international initiatives that work towards 
addressing the negative effects of globalisation through pushing for reforming 
international institutions and regimes. This has led the government to an essentially 
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contradictory position where their policies are based on „strategies of both 
accommodation and challenge‟ to the neoliberal order (Carim cited in Taylor, 
2003:2). On the basis of the position South Africa has taken, Taylor argues that the 
reformist strive of the government has not been directed at the essential core of the 
global order, but has rather been focused on addressing problems that arise within 
the system.  
Through a discussion of the different forces that shape South African policy, Taylor 
puts significant emphasis on the central role that ideology plays within the 
maintenance of power relations in both an international and domestic context. By 
evaluating how the post-apartheid government formed its policies in accordance with 
the „requirements‟ of the neoliberal world order, based on a ideological conversion 
within its leading members, Taylor addresses some of the shortcomings of 
Abrahamsson‟s approach. The description of the connection between capital and the 
political elite in South Africa and how this convinced the leadership within the ANC to 
abandon a policy that could compromise the interest of big business, is valuable in 
terms of providing an illustration of how different social groups can affect the form 
of state. Additionally, Taylor‟s description of how the ANC puts emphasis on 
communicating that its foreign policy would be extrovert and focus on a regional 
approach to development, can be related to the middle power identity described in 
Chapter 2. I will argue in Chapter 4 that by taking such an approach, the ANC 
legitimised and justified its market-oriented policy, both domestically and 
internationally, thus putting the government in a position where they promoted the 
regional establishment of a historic bloc.  
Throughout his study, Taylor adds a level of complexity in the application of CCT 
compared to Abrahamsson by disaggregating some of the actors that he includes in 
the study. Firstly, by moving away from assessing the hegemon as a state, namely 
the US, Taylor puts more focus on the role of the transnational hegemonic classes, 
particularly the South African economic and political elite and the left wing 
movements. This allows him to put more weight on the informal as well as the 
formal connections between the state and the hegemonic forces on both an 
international and a domestic level. By taking this more nuanced approach to the 
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different actors, it also becomes easier to understand the conflicts that are taking 
place between actors. However, I would argue that Taylor could explore this point 
even further. Although he points out that the leadership within the ANC has put 
significant emphasis on not alienating the Leftist fractions of the party, Taylor‟s 
discussion of the conflicts that took place during the ideological transition of the 
leadership is rather limited. He describes how any counter-hegemonic impulses were 
„swiftly marginalised by a battery of organic intellectuals and the constraints at force 
in the contemporary international political economy‟ (Taylor, 2003:9). However, it is 
not clear from his text that large proportions within the ANC remained unconvinced 
by the neoliberal rhetoric, something that has been particularly visible after the 
Polokwane conference at the end of 2007. By incorporating a larger analysis on 
these counter-hegemonic tendencies, one would be in a better position to evaluate 
the alternatives for change in the current order. 
3.9 Accounting for social forces from below 
Throughout his work, Cox puts particular emphasis on the need to include a bottom 
up perspective, thus including a focus on the marginalised social forces. Whereas the 
working class has been the typical political catalyst for the hoped for change, Cox 
(1987:352) describes how this class has been increasingly fractionalised and cannot 
be regarded as being united in their struggle against the managerial classes, where 
the working class elements that retain some power are too bound up with the 
existing system. Instead Cox describes how the excluded groups of “non-class” 
workers2, who feel alienated from the existing society and the production process, 
represent a more likely emancipatory force. Furthermore, Cox points out that the 
conditions for marginalised social forces in Third World countries make them 
potentially receptive for social protests linked to production and thereby making 
them more conducive to initiate transformation from below.  
While the need for the inclusion of a bottom up perspective is argued for by many 
scholars that apply CCT, the studies that make serious attempts at understanding 
the perspective of these marginalised groups are limited. Murphy (2007:9) argues 
                                        
2 Cox‟s use of the term “non-class” is heavily influenced by Gorz (1982) and his reflections on 
possibilities for social change.  
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that many critical theorists try to take a bottom up approach without placing 
themselves in the life worlds of these who really are at „the bottom‟, and therefore 
are unable to understand the global economy in the ways they do. The basis of this 
argument is that that the majority of the scholars that pursue a critical perspective 
are almost invariably white, wealthy and Anglophone, with very few links to the 
impoverished populations in the Third World, and therefore that their claims of 
understanding the common sense of the world‟s most disadvantaged should not be 
uncritically accepted.  
While Murphy traces the lack of understanding back to the limitations that many 
scholars have in terms of their ethnographic skills, there are some studies that use 
other means to circumvent this problem. Leysens (2002) pursues an interesting 
alternative to the ethnographical approach to measure the perspectives and opinions 
from below. By using large datasets3 that are developed from countries across 
Southern Africa, Leysens examines some of the characteristics that would indicate 
the potential for social revolt in the different groups involved in the study, such as 
attitudes on state legitimacy, political participation, political interests and personal 
economic values. Based on Cox‟s conceptualisation of different social groups 
(marginalised, precarious and integrated) Leysens uses the datasets to examine the 
political characteristics of the different groups and thus ends up with a „snapshot‟ of 
the collective images in the different segments of the societies. The study finds that 
the marginalised express that they are more willing than other groups to discard 
democracy in favour of other political systems, but that they are more politically 
apathetic, and that they are not actively pursuing activities that support counter 
hegemonic ideology. This could indicate that Cox‟s thoughts concerning the potential 
for revolt amongst the marginalised in Third World countries need to be qualified 
and contextualised. 
There are many different limitations to using such quantitative analyses within a CCT 
framework. Besides the various technical challenges that need to be overcome in 
                                        
3 Leysens uses the Southern African Barometer that was initiated and coordinated in 1999 by 
different research partners across the region.   
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order to get an accurate measure of the different group‟s attitudes4, the results of 
the analysis are highly dependent on the interpretation of the researcher. Such 
research is therefore vulnerable to large fluctuations, which makes the researchers 
reflections on their own perceptions even more important, and the results needs to 
be understood in a context of a firmly established theoretical framework. However, 
despite its limitations, the study provides an important measure of the political 
situation in a geographical area at a given time, which can provide insight into the 
political attitudes of different groups, if it is used in relation with other academic 
research. The value of the quantitative research also increases as the magnitude of 
the study expands, and the datasets are collected over a number of years. Seen in 
light of these limitations, Leysens‟ study provides important empirical information in 
improving the quality of information regarding marginalised social groups in Third 
World countries. Furthermore the study underlines the importance of including a 
measure of these groups in terms of understanding the forces, or lack thereof, that 
push for change from below. Although Leysens‟ study by no means disproves the 
rhetoric behind Cox‟s theory regarding the role of marginalised social groups, it 
challenges this perception and emphasises the need for further research on these 
groups. 
3.10 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has examined the applicability of CCT in describing the relationship 
between production, power and world order. This has been done through the 
evaluation of how different scholars have used the framework in their analysis. First, 
I examined Cox‟s description of the evolving world orders, from the Liberal order 
until the contemporary order. This examination was included in the study for two 
main reasons: it illustrates how Cox applied his own theoretical framework, which 
was introduced in Chapter 2, and it provided a historical context from which the 
prevailing world order is derived. Particularly the examination of Cox‟s analysis of the 
development of the neoliberal order in the post-Second World War period provided a 
thorough illustration of how the historical context was conducive for the 
                                        
4 Because of space limitations these will not be explored in this text.  
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establishment of American hegemony, and how this reflected in the restructuring of 
the state and production.  
Although Cox attempts to capture the relations in developing countries through his 
description of protostates and neo-mercantilist states, I argued that he does not put 
weight on providing examples from the Third World, particularly Africa. In the last 
part of the chapter I examined three scholars that used CCT to describe relations in 
Southern Africa. These studies were evaluated in terms of their strengths and 
weaknesses, and provided useful examples of how CCT can be applied from different 
points of entry. 
The examination of how CCT has been applied has illustrated the logic behind the 
theoretical framework and particularly how the different spheres of activity are 
highly integrated with one another. The description of the changing world orders 
showed how there was a parallel development between changes in forms of state, 
production relations, historical blocs and world order. The proceeding case study will 
draw from the findings generated in this chapter in attempting to understand how 
social forces at different levels have influenced the Mozambican development theory.   
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Chapter 4 
Development and the Mozambican state/society complex 
 
So far this text has debated the theoretical perspectives of CCT and its application in 
both a global and a regional context. This chapter will advance this discussion by 
further narrowing the geographical focus and use CCT in the evaluation of the 
impact social forces in Mozambique have on development policies. Over the last 
decades there have been several good studies on political and economic 
development in Mozambique (World Bank, 2007; Castel Branco, 2004; Hanlon, 2007; 
Sumich & Honwana, 2007). The added value of this study will be to approach the 
issue by examining how the different social forces, both domestic and regional, have 
competed for power and finally how this has reflected in the development strategy in 
Mozambique. 
Firstly the chapter will analyse how the Mozambican society was heavily divided 
between a political and economic elite of Portuguese decent and a large indigenous 
class of peasantry. It will be argued that the Portuguese elite had a low degree of 
consent for their rule and dependent on a strong security sector to maintain control. 
From this point of departure, the chapter will examine the social transformation after 
independence and how a small group of intellectuals gained control over the state 
and, despite early socialist commitment, gradually privatised the economy in line 
with the Washington consensus.  
Turning to a more regional approach, the chapter will describe how the economic 
elite waged significant influence on the policies of the post-apartheid ANC 
government. Furthermore, I will argue that the government assumed a role as a 
middle power, and have used this role to wage influence in the region and 
perpetuated the Washington consensus through emphasising regional market 
oriented development policies. I will use the Maputo Development Corridor, which 
has become a flagship development project in the region, as a case study to 
examine the relationship between the economic and political elites in Mozambique 
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and South Africa and how they have cooperated in setting up a project that has 
resulted in high growth, but little widespread human development.  
In the final section of the chapter, I will examine how Frelimo has been able to 
continue their rule without resorting to authoritarianism. This examination will be 
important in furthering the understanding of the potential for structural change in 
the country. I will argue although the civil society is highly underdeveloped, the 
underlying discontent with the situation among the peasantry and the working class 
has been exacerbated by the food and fuel crisis and has made people willing to 
work for change. Furthermore, I will argue that the deepening financial crisis might 
shift the power balance in Mozambique and represent an opportunity for change.  
4.1 Portuguese colonial rule 
An ideal type view of the Portuguese colonial state in Mozambique can perhaps be 
best represented by comparing it to the legacy of the African colonial state. Whereas 
Young (2004) describes how the African colonial states were often defined by a 
colonial presence as an enforcer of the indirect rule, the Portuguese never 
thoroughly consolidated it territorial dominance in Mozambique. This was particularly 
the case in the northern parts of the country where the Portuguese, instead of 
taking responsibility for developing it, leased large areas to concession companies 
(Chabal, 2001). In return these companies would enjoy a monopoly of the economy 
and relative autonomy in their areas. At the same time, the state‟s close relationship 
with the British-South African mining capital resulted in the sending of a large 
number of workers to the Gauteng area to work in the mines. The result was that 
Northern Mozambique became a labour reserve, but without enjoying the benefits 
such as administration, education and health. Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995) 
explain that during the 1960s ninety-three percent of the population in Mozambique 
were illiterate and that medical services were non-existent.  
Although the provision of services to the black population in Southern Mozambique 
was rare, the Portuguese colonial state took more control over the economy. The 
state regulated the prices for agricultural cash crops in the south and provided the 
Portuguese settlers that set up plantations with a opportunity to make good profits. 
At the same time, they allowed the indigenous farmers to sell their goods at the 
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market, but to a significantly lower price than they offered the Portuguese. The state 
was also involved in setting up an extensive industrial sector around the Maputo 
area. This sector was mostly set up in corporatist institutions at the state level and 
there were strong bonds between the state and the economic elite (Abrahamsson & 
Nilsson, 1995).   
In a less functionalist perspective, an examination of the process of political struggle 
during the period of the Portuguese colonial rule was characterised by strong rivalry 
between different social forces. As will be described below, these struggles were 
concerned essentially with the line between access to and exclusion from power in 
the state and the economy and would eventually cause the transition from the 
colonial state.  
 The main liberation movement in Mozambique, Frelimo (Frente de LibertaÇão de 
Moçambique), was established in 1962 by a group of intellectual assimilados (the 
assimilated), a small black elite of petty-bourgeoisie from the South. Englund (2002) 
explains that although the socialist rhetoric within Frelimo was developed at an early 
stage, this ideological tendency was exaggerated as the movement became 
dependent on considerable military supplies and training from both China and the 
Soviet Union. However, Englund points out that this revolutionary agenda of social 
justice played an important role in separating the movement from the Portuguese 
colonial oppressors and thereby disarmed many critics in moral terms. This agenda 
provided the assimilados from the south with sufficient legitimacy to rally widespread 
support from peasant groups in large areas of the country.  
Ironically, it was among the assimilados that the resistance towards the Portuguese 
leadership was most significant. Sumich and Honwana (2007) argue that they 
became alienated by the Portuguese authorities as a result of their lack of rights and 
possibilities to increase their social status. As a result of these clear divisions 
between the black population and the „Mozambican‟ Portuguese, there was an 
absence of a black middle class, in which the Portuguese could have allied 
themselves before independence. Instead, when the policy began to change, there 
was a general radicalisation behind the liberation movement. 
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According to Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995), Frelimo‟s leadership consisted of 
largely two fractions, one „revolutionary‟ and one „reactionary‟. They describe that 
from an early point in the liberation effort there was a power struggle between these 
two fractions on how to structure the country in the post-colony period. While the 
revolutionaries recommended a radical transformation of society, the reactionaries 
pushed for a structure where Frelimo‟s members would themselves occupy the place 
of the Portuguese without any major social changes. In a violent clash in 1975, the 
revolutionary fractions gained control over the movement and the reactionary 
fractions fled to the central areas of the country. This struggle for power resulted in 
an elitist leadership structure with widespread control.   
This examination of the Portuguese colonial state in Mozambique enables us to 
return to the more analytical discussion regarding the state. One important point has 
been that the form of state was dependent on the historical structures on which it 
rests. Although there was little consent for the Portuguese rule, the state, dependent 
on its material capabilities, maintained control through repressive means. At the 
same time, the main rival social force remained weakened by internal fractionising 
regarding its ideological persuasion and its capability of working towards a passive 
revolution, as described in Chapter 2, was limited. The following section will describe 
how the world order influenced the formation of a new historic bloc in Mozambique 
and the form of state that Frelimo eventually established. 
4.2 The Mozambican state form 
Although Frelimo managed to challenge Portuguese militarily control in some areas 
in the northern parts of the country, independence in 1975 was more a result of 
political change in Lisbon than of the liberation war in Mozambique. Englund (2002) 
explains that because the liberation came quite suddenly and somewhat 
unexpectedly, Frelimo had to quickly transform from being a liberation movement to 
becoming a ruling partly with a broad political agenda. Furthermore, with the 
widespread white exodus, Frelimo had to take over and run an effectively bankrupt 
country with virtually no trained people. Sumich and Honwana (2007:7) describe 
how at the time of liberalisation there were “six economists, two agronomists, not a 
single geologist, and fewer than a thousand black high school graduates in all of 
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Mozambique”. The ability of the state to develop large scale policies to follow 
through on its promises made during the liberation struggle was therefore highly 
limited.  
In 1977 Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard, which was followed by a 
series of socialist transformations that included nationalisation of plantations and 
factories and massive forced settlements into communal villages (Englund, 2002). 
However, as Pitcher (2002:5) points out, the “poorly designed, hastily enacted 
policies rooted in grandiose visions about the state‟s ability to transform society 
strangled the projects almost from the beginning”, and the Soviet Union expressed 
from an early stage that they did not have the capacity to assist the socialist project. 
The policy failures following independence were particularly visible in the agricultural 
sectors where seven years after Frelimo came to power, less than half the area that 
had been commercially cultivated during Portuguese rule had been put in use 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995). The newly established state had quickly run into 
severe financial difficulties and was desperate for external assistance.  
At the face of a worsening economic and security situation, the Fourth Party 
Congress of Frelimo came to the agreement that the party was in urgent need of 
Western political and economic support to deal with the severe drought, worsening 
terms of trade and an increased South African destabilization policy. Abrahamsson 
(1997:212) describes how initially Mozambique‟s request for food aid was turned 
down by the U.S., but that after pressure from Prime Minister Thatcher, the Reagan 
administration reconsidered the situation, and integrated Mozambique into their 
“constructive engagement” policies. Furthermore, he describes how this policy was 
directed at putting pressure for the abolishment of apartheid and reducing the 
influence from Moscow. In this way Mozambique had directly become part in the 
bipolar power game that dominated the world order at the time. 
From the time of inclusion in the U.S. food aid program in 1984, there was a rapidly 
improving relation between the political elite in Mozambique and “Western” actors, 
both on a political and economical level. Pitcher (2002) describes how President 
Machel and later President Chissano made several visits to Washington D.C. for talks 
with American government officials and the IFIs and how these visits resulted in 
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close personal relationships. Furthermore she explains how meetings with Western 
and South African businessmen „climbed up the government agenda in tandem with 
increased talk about the “free market” and “restructuring”‟ (Pitcher, 2002:106). 
These visits resulted in a gradual increase in the involvement of Mozambican private 
business in the international economy. Although, as Cox (1983) mentions, it is 
difficult to make assumptions on the basis of motivation, one could argue on the 
basis of the outcome of these improved relations that the Frelimo elite, which 
controlled the large parts of production, became more integrated into the 
transnational hegemonic class.  
However, the turn towards a more market based economy took place at the same 
time as other parts of the state were following a socialist master plan with reinforced 
state participation in industry. The liberalisation was particularly visible around the 
Maputo area where the state sought a number of strategic alliances with 
international capital and private investors through joint-venture agreements. At the 
same time, Frelimo enforced the collective village programs that resettled large parts 
of the rural populations in villages that would collectively produce cash-crops for the 
state (Bruck, 2006). These parallel developments can be interpreted as an indication 
of the changing ideas within Frelimo, where a powerful segment of the leadership 
developed gradually stronger ties with private business.  
The conflicting policy approaches caused a deepening of the grievances among 
different social groups, particularly in the central and northern areas of the country 
that experienced the brunt of the collective villages programs. To add to the 
grievances, when the U.S. eventually agreed to give aid to ease the situation in 
Mozambique, it was given in kind and not in cash, thus greatly disturbing the local 
food markets and destroying the livelihood of a large groups of agricultural cash 
crop producers (Abrahamsson, 1997).  
By the end of the 1980s two important social forces had developed in Mozambique. 
There was one small group connected with the political and economic elite that had 
exercised control over both the government, and thus the security sector, and over a 
growing proportion of the private industry in Mozambique. The second group 
consisted of a large alienated group of peasantry located in central Mozambique. 
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Carbone (2005) argues that this latter group quickly became discontent with the 
policies of Frelimo and would later provide crucial support to the Renamo operations. 
He notes, however, that Renamo never developed an ideological platform beyond 
opposing the government and thus never managed to expand their support base 
beyond these areas.  
Despite early difficulties, the ties between the political elite in Mozambique and 
Western governments were further improved by Mozambique‟s membership in the 
Bretton Woods Institution in 1985. Following this membership was a promise of 
economic growth if the country was to conform to principles underlying the 
Washington Consensus and further its liberalising strategy (Wuyts, 1991). These 
promises were backed by a significant flow of financial aid that came on the 
condition that Mozambique had to adhere to the structural adjustment programs 
that were hastily put together by staff from the IMF.  
However, the IMF‟s emphasis was nearly exclusively on improving the 
macroeconomic conditions by addressing the balance of payment problems by 
greatly reducing government spending and structuring the national economy for 
export oriented growth. Wuyts (1991:218) describes how these programs were very 
much in line with the prevailing neoliberalist consensus and „sought to effect a shift 
in resources from the state sector towards the wider economy by imposing greater 
financial discipline on the state budget and on state enterprises to avoid the 
negative consequences of the crowding-out effect and, by relying principally on 
market forces, to reallocate resources thus set free within the economy at large‟. 
Because the Mozambican government already at this early point was dependent on 
the aid flows, it was put under strong pressure to reform the economy in line with 
the international consensus.  
However, the transition from socialist to liberalist policies in Mozambique also needs 
to be understood as an internally driven process, where strong domestic forces 
pushed for change. Pitcher (2002) argues that the role of the Mozambican state in 
the restructuring of the country is often underestimated and that the state was just 
as influential in the development of capitalist forces as it was to the outcome of 
socialism. Although the liberalisation debate fractionised Frelimo and created 
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movements both in favour and against liberalist reform, the socialist rhetoric 
gradually disappeared from policies, clearly seen in the Constitution established in 
1990.  
Pitcher (2002) explains the transformation of the market liberal privatisation process 
by describing the ways in which this process presented opportunities for certain 
groups to gain powerful positions. This process can in itself been seen as a source of 
power, as it was the state that decided which companies to be privatised, how these 
companies should be valued, how the bidding process should take place (open or 
closed) and the costs that were associated with these transactions. Furthermore she 
argues that the government used these different mechanisms to determine the 
winners and losers and thus used the process to build up a new constituency for the 
state. On the basis of the active promotion of liberal reform undertaken by central 
members within the Frelimo party, Pitcher concludes that it is inaccurate to treat the 
Mozambican side as passive and unable to determine the transformation towards 
liberalist reform, but rather that it was a cooperation between certain groups of the 
political elite and external actors. Particularly the Frelimo elite, which at this point 
had strong ties to the regional and global business community, took a central part in 
this process.  
The form of state in Mozambique developed characteristics that are similar to Cox‟s 
(1987:218) notion of protostates, which are „political structures that try more or less 
successfully to monopolize the capacity for exercising political force within the 
national territory but have not acquired either a firm social basis of consent or the 
administrative capacity to formulate and apply affective economic policies‟. An 
important aspect of such states is that they lack the capability to reshape society 
and the mode of production and that survive because society is not strong enough 
to come up with alternative forms of state. Based on the evaluation of the 
relationship with South Africa that is described below, however, I will argue that the 
Frelimo state falls short of Cox‟s description of the neomercantilist state as it has 
failed to successfully control the access of foreigners to the national economy.  
From examining the establishment of the independent Frelimo state, one could 
argue that the role of external actors in influencing the form of state in Mozambique 
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remained highly significant. This examination allows us to return to make two more 
analytical propositions. First, the historic bloc that Frelimo based it governing power 
on was weak. They had a lack of material resources and production capacity, they 
had a weak civil society that failed in creating communal images, and there were 
few state institutions to create mechanisms to deal with rival collective images. 
Consequently their authority soon became challenged by rival social forces. Second, 
the global hegemonic institutions, the BWIs, played a significant role in spreading 
the hegemonic ideology in Mozambique through giving aid and supporting 
privatisation reforms, which I argued strengthened the ties between the Frelimo elite 
and the transnational hegemonic class. The discussion will now evaluate how the 
dominant social forces in post-apartheid South Africa became highly influential in 
structuring the regional order.  
4.3 Changing regional dynamics 
A number of events around 1990 would have strong implications for the southern 
African region and for Mozambique. The shift in world order with the end of the Cold 
War, from bipolarity to a more discursive focus, meant that the US‟s fear of the 
socialist influence in region was heavily diminished and thereby also its interests in 
supporting „friendly‟ states. Perhaps even more importantly, the political transition in 
post-apartheid South Africa became a major turning point in the development of the 
regional relations. The following section will analyse how the configuration of social 
forces that exercised power in South Africa advocated a regional approach to the 
development challenges, which had strong implications for its neighbours.  
Throughout the 1980s relations in the region were strongly influenced by the 
apartheid regime‟s destabilization policies and the relationship between South Africa, 
and its neighbouring countries, often referred to as the Front Line states, remained 
highly hostile. There was a tandem development of the South African president 
Botha‟s „total strategy‟, which was highly focused around securing the white majority 
rule in the country, and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), which sought to reduce South Africa‟s influence, both economically and 
politically in the region (Hanlon, 1996). This hostile relationship was materialised in 
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Mozambique through the apartheid regime‟s support to Renamo, while Frelimo 
allowed the ANC to set up military training camps along the border.  
Throughout the liberation struggle the ANC was often considered to have socialist 
aspirations for the post-apartheid form of state. During the transition period radical 
fractions of the ANC, COSATU, and other parts of civil society established the 
Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) to develop a socialist based macroeconomic 
framework (Guy, 2004). The outcome of MERG was to form the basis of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), that was adopted by the ANC 
shortly before the elections in 1994. RDP was based on the principles of growth 
through redistribution and stated that „the democratic government must play a 
leading and enabling role in guiding the economy and the market towards 
reconstruction and development‟ (Terreblanche, 2003:108). Before the elections in 
1994 there was much emphasis on the significance of the RDP.  
Despite the socialist aspirations that the ANC emphasised externally, Terreblanche 
(2003) contends that the party became fractionalised in its ideological conviction in 
the mid 1980s, as ties between parts of the ANC elite and the South African business 
community grew closer. Chabane et al. (2006) describe how these groups, together 
with the influential forces in the international community, strongly opposed the RDP 
strategy. They note how particularly the high-profile businessman Harry 
Oppenheimer regularly met with Mandela and advised him on different issues on 
behalf of the business community. Furthermore, they describe how Oppenheimer 
was central in the South African Foundation‟s release of the Growth for All policy 
document, which vigorously (and successfully) attacked the redistributionist 
emphasis of the RDP and on the grounds of “macroeconomic stability” proposed an 
aggressive liberalisation and conservative macroeconomic policies (Chabane et al., 
2003:572). 
According to Guy (2004) the ANC‟s announcement of the new economic program 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) in 1996 had a 
significant symbolic effect of ending the open ideological debates within the party. 
GEAR was strongly supported by the conglomerates in South Africa and emphasised 
the importance of setting the macroeconomic fundaments in the economy and 
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adjusting the domestic policy environment to global challenges, in particular with 
regard to the trading system (Qobo, 2007). Central for the development aspect of 
investment led growth is the notion of the “trickle down” effect that ensures that all 
parts of society are able to gain from the growth. The “trickle down” effect implies 
that as certain groups gain from growth, they will spend money in their local 
environment and thus contribute to empowering the local economy as a whole.  
At the same time, the ANC‟s regional policies changed considerably after they gained 
power in 1994. The ANC clearly stated their ambition to transform the role of South 
Africa in the region through chartering a new foreign policy that reflected their wish 
to become a „responsible global citizen‟. Mandela (1993:89) noted that this would 
include addressing development challenges as a collective enterprise of southern 
Africa‟s people and „resisting any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests 
at the expense of the subcontinent‟. This rhetoric was continued after the ANC came 
to power and became particularly visible in 1996 through Thabo Mbeki‟s “I am an 
African” speech to the South African Parliament where he reignited the vision of the 
African Renaissance.  
Going back to the notion of a middle power, as discussed in Chapter 2, one could 
argue that the ANC embraced a foreign policy that can be compared to Jordaan‟s 
(2003) description of the middle power:  a state that seeks to promote „cohesion and 
stability‟ in the region and promoting itself as a advocate of the well being of the 
region, rather than focusing on its national interests. By using such middle power 
rhetoric, one could argue that the ANC legitimized an expansionist foreign policy, 
both to its domestic constituency and to its neighbours, by referring to the good 
intent of the new regime.  
One way the ANC manifested its concern for regional cooperation was through the 
development of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), based on an 
agreement centred on reducing the economic dependence of South Africa. The 
establishment of SADC was based on furthering the integration in the region and 
thus decreasing the economic dependence on the developed countries 
(Hammerstad, 2005). Article five of the treaty states that SADC is to promote 
common political values, systems and institutions, which have been reflected in the 
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setting up of institutional frameworks that has worked towards the implementation 
of the issues that is at hand. SADC has thus become strongly ideologically based 
organisation that has developed an extensive institutional framework for the 
implementation of its objectives.  
Many of the systems and institutions that have been promoted through SADC have 
been related to facilitating for investment lead growth as advocated in South Africa‟s 
GEAR policy. This has particularly been visible in the South African lead Spatial 
Development Initiative (SDI) programmes, which had become an important part of 
the ANC‟s economic strategy and had been developed in close cooperation with the 
private business community. Jordaan (1998:718) explains that the „SDIs are 
targeted interventions by central government for helping unlock economic potential 
and facilitate new investment and job creation in a localised area or region‟. More 
specifically the SDIs are targeted at removing bottlenecks or constraints to 
investment, which are often infrastructural in nature (roads, ports, rail, etc.). The 
second prong of the SDI programme, according to Jordaan, is the identification of 
strategic investment opportunities in the SDI area. These are often directed at 
strengthening the performance of the key clusters in the local economy.  
The SDIs are formed on the principle that projects are most efficiently implemented 
when they provide incentives for private business to invest in these projects.  
Rogerson (2001) explains that the South African government has strongly endorsed 
the notion of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to attract the sufficient amount of 
investment capital, particularly in infrastructure. He states that the South African 
government intends to leverage the private sector investment on the basis of a 1:9 
ratio, i.e. for every 1 Rand spent by the public sector in SDIs, 9 Rand must be 
brought in by the private sector. In this way the private sector have become highly 
involved in these initiatives and have become a vital part of the regional 
development strategy.  
The outcome of South Africa‟s regional development strategy has been highly 
lucrative for big business. Leysens (2001) points out that with the liberalisation of 
markets since the early 1990‟s, Southern Africa has become the main export market 
for South Africa‟s manufactured products. According to Adebajo and Landsberg 
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(2003), South Africa accounts for 80 percent of the SADC‟s GNP and has a six-to-one 
favourable trade balance with the other members of the organisation. Furthermore, 
the large scale development projects that have dominated the transnational 
partnerships have contracted big money and Mandela‟s assurances to the region 
with regards to their concern for mutual regional development has not materialised.  
From examining the political transformation in the post-apartheid period one could 
argue that the economic elite in South Africa persuaded the ANC to pursue a strong 
regional approach to development. Furthermore I have argued that the ANC has 
used a middle power rhetoric to justify an expansionist foreign policy and through 
arranging the regional institutional mechanisms to promote market oriented 
cooperation consistent with the neoliberal consensus, thus perpetuating the values 
of the hegemonic force in the world order.  
4.4 A feasible development strategy in Mozambique 
Economic cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa is not a new 
phenomenon. The difference, however, is the increased magnitude of this 
relationship since the end of apartheid as South Africa has become the undisputed 
largest investment partner in Mozambique. This section will evaluate how social 
forces in South Africa have established strong links to the Frelimo elite and how they 
have influenced the development strategy in Mozambique.  
As described above, the ties between Frelimo and South African businessmen were 
developed already in the early 1980s. However, the materialisation of these ties, 
through South African investment, did not take place on a large scale until the ANC 
came to power in 1994. Castel-Branco (2002:13) describes how the ANC, together 
with large conglomerates, developed a high level cooperation with Frelimo to 
facilitate the expansion of South African corporations in Mozambique. In particular 
he mentions Sasol and ESKOM‟s expansion of their control over energy sources and 
the location of Mozal, an aluminium smelter, in Mozambique as two areas where this 
cooperation has been of highest significance. He explains how these meetings 
resulted in the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), which was launched in 1996 in 
Maputo by the presidents of South African and Mozambique and has become „the 
most advanced international development corridor in Africa‟ (Mitchell, 1998:757).  
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The MDC was one of the first SDIs to be initiated and has worked as a model for 
many of the later projects.  Soderbaum and Taylor (2001:681) explain how the 
initiation of the MDC had the objections of: 
„(i) rehabilitate the primary infrastructure network, notably road, rail, port and 
dredging and border posts, with the participation of private sector in order to 
have minimum impact on government spending; (ii) to maximise investment and 
provide access to global capital, facilitate regional markets and regional economic 
integration; (iii) to maximise social development and employment opportunities 
and increase the participation of historically disadvantaged communities; and (iv) 
to ensure the sustainability by developing policy, strategies and frameworks that 
should ensure what  is stated to be a holistic, participatory and environmentally 
sustainable approach to development‟.   
The strong role of private investment in the work towards development in the MDC 
became a model that had strong influence on the structuring of the Government of 
Mozambique‟s Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) in 2001. 
This plan strongly emphasises a market dependent development approach and the 
need to „foster the development of the national business community and create an 
environment favourable for investment‟ (paragraph 108). The strong political weight 
behind these programs is also evident through examining the terms of investment 
that they are given. Castel-Branco (2004) describes how the governments of both 
Mozambique and South Africa have worked closely to come up with a variety of 
means to ensure the profitability for investors. Firstly, he describes how Mozal has 
been given Free Industrial Zone (FIZ) status, which means that it is exempted from 
paying duties on imports of material inputs, equipment, parts and any other imports 
that are required for the company. FIZ status also means that industries are 
exempted from paying value-added tax and the corporate taxes are greatly reduced. 
In addition the governments subsidised variable costs which have greatly increased 
the profitability of these industries. This will be described further below.  
The MDC is characterised by a few mega-projects that have a significant effect on 
the overall Mozambican economy. These projects have largely been financed by 
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foreign investments, where particularly Mozal and rejuvenation of the port of Maputo 
stand out in terms of size. Mozal alone attracted $2.2 billion from a variety of foreign 
investors, while the construction in the port of Maputo attracted investments of an 
initial $70 million (Thomas, 2005). Only four percent of the total investments made 
came from the Government of Mozambique. This means that the government has 
very little ownership to the projects initiated through the MDC. Rogerson‟s (2000) 
study reveal that in the demographic characteristics of the ownership in the process 
is remarkably homogenous. A very high proportion of the investors are white males 
from the economic elite in South Africa and many are related to the large 
conglomerates.  
The benefits from the MDC have been spread. The foreign investors in Mozal have 
enjoyed highly favourable conditions for their investments as South Africa has 
agreed to subsidise energy, the single largest cost in aluminium production. Castel-
Branco (2002:9) describes how at an early stage of manufacturing at Mozal, 
Mozambique‟s imports of energy from South Africa increased 20 times. South African 
transport companies have enjoyed increased business, as they have been awarded 
nearly all contracts related to the MDC. While the benefits for the Mozambicans are 
not equally apparent, there are certain groups that have benefited greatly from the 
MDC. First, the investments have enhanced Mozambique‟s reputation abroad, as 
they can use the MDC as a show case, demonstrating the countries viability and 
enhancing investor confidence. Secondly it is important to point out that the 
investments in the MDC have increased access to capital for big business in 
Mozambique through improve credit ratings. 
The effect of the MDC projects on the Mozambican economy as a whole has been 
large. Mozal contributed to approximately 10 percent of annual growth in 2001, a 
number that has remained consistently high since then. At the same time the 
aluminium smelter accounted for more than 70 percent of the total exports in 
Mozambique in 2004 and has become a major source of foreign currency (Dibben, 
2006). The overall impact on the economy has been limited because of Mozal‟s 
heavy reliance on acquisition on imported materials and services, mostly from South 
Africa (Castel-Branco 2004). Furthermore, Castel-Branco (2004) argues that out of 
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the net profits of Mozal, only 25% are actually retained by the Mozambican 
economy, when one accounts for profit repatriation, payments of investment 
services and transfer of wages of foreign workers. The net impact of this project is 
therefore much smaller than what its contribution to the growth in GDP might imply. 
The MDC‟s effect on the broader economy has also been limited. Rogerson 
(2000:327) describes that one of the guiding principles of the MDC was to „broaden 
the ownership base of the economy and maximise the impact of new investments 
for the development of the small, medium and micro-enterprise (SMME) economy. 
However, he notes that the vast majority of the investment has gone to the mega-
projects, leaving little to the development of the SMMEs. At the same time these 
projects have been highly capital intensive and their net contribution to the 
employment rate in Mozambique have not come close to reflecting their weight of 
GDP (Mitchell, 1998). Because these projects employ such a limited amount of 
labour, the trickle-down effect is greatly reduced, as there are fewer workers to 
spend their wages in the local communities in the vicinity of the projects.  
There are also important environmental issues that need to be pointed out. Besides 
the environmental aspects of the production of the vast amounts of energy that is 
required to manufacture aluminium, Soderbaum and Taylor (2001) argue that Mozal 
consumes nearly 40 per cent of the Maputo region‟s total water resources and also 
posing a threat to the ecological security, by discharging much of this water without 
adequately rinsing it for pollutants. These types of environmental damages are 
difficult to assess in terms of their absolute social costs for society as a whole and 
have typically been easy to large corporations to avoid in developing countries. To 
deal with such issues in an adequate manner, governments need to develop the 
necessary capabilities of both monitoring and implementing appropriate legislation to 
ensure that the cost are taken by the perpetrators. 
By looking at the small impact that the MDC has had on human development in 
Mozambique one could argue that this development strategy has failed. Yet, by 
regarding the different social forces that have been involved in the forming of the 
strategy and the outcomes it seems more relevant to ask „for whom is the MDC 
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failing, and how‟. One element that one can draw from the evaluation of the impact 
of the social forces is that the economic and political elite in South Africa have 
promoted a regional development model based on a neoliberal approach with large 
scale private investment and a minimal degree of state involvement. While this study 
has shown that this has strengthened the control over production by big business in 
both South African and Mozambique, the lower social classes seem to only have 
been further marginalised. 
4.5 Potential for structural change 
The final part of this study will examine the potential for structural change in 
Mozambique. Earlier in the chapter I argued that the ruling authority in Mozambique 
did not assume power through a passive revolution and have not enjoyed 
hegemonic capacity, Frelimo has been able to navigate around an organic crisis 
without turning to repressive means. In these final paragraphs I will further describe 
how external forces play an important role in supporting the historic structures in 
Mozambique and maintaining the status quo. On the basis of this description I will 
evaluate potential rival groups that could challenge the current configuration of 
social forces and thus promote change. 
As was described in Chapter 2, Gramsci (Cox, 1983) used the example of the 
Bolshevik Revolution to explain how an attack on the state by a war on movement 
would have failed if the civil society of the ruling party would have been more highly 
developed. Similarly, with the lack of hegemonic capacity in Mozambique, it would 
be reasonable to believe that the state would depend on using recessive authority to 
maintain power. Abrahamsson (2003) argues, however, that the organic crisis in 
Mozambique has been avoided because of the heavy intervention of the 
international society, where aid has provided the emerging national bourgeoisie with 
the possibilities for individual achievement. This argument follows from the 
assumption that the individuals that potentially could enter a war of position with the 
government have personal incentives in maintaining the status quo with weak 
market forces and inefficient allocation forces. This argument supports Pitchers 
(2003) description of powerful individuals in the government gaining power in the 
privatization process of previously state owned companies.  
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One of the leading foreign scholars on Mozambique, Joseph Hanlon, argues that the 
donor community is prepared to tolerate quite blatant corruption as long as Frelimo 
is willing to rapidly pursue „market-friendly‟ policy changes (Hanlon, 2004). He uses 
the example of the BWIs strong support for the highly corrupt process of privatising 
the banking sector, where leading figures in Frelimo acquired personal control over 
the banking sector. Furthermore, Hanlon describes how major donor countries have 
ignored the corruption problem, and turned their backs on the honest bankers, 
journalists, prosecutors and civil society by arguing that „investigating and 
prosecuting corruption requires resources that Mozambique cannot afford‟ 
(2004:760). 
Going further than ignoring corruption in Mozambique, Castel-Branco (forthcoming) 
contends that the involvement of the donor community has strengthened the ruling 
government by creating a situation where it is heavily dependent on aid to provide 
basic services. He explains that the Mozambican government can shift the blame of 
reform by ensuring that those resisting the reform understand that the reform 
package is imposed by donors and that the policy space for initiative and institutional 
innovation is small. In this way the ruling elite, in cooperation with the international 
donor community, creates a situation that takes away the agency of the government 
and entrenches the sentiment that “there is no alternative”.   
So where does this leave us in terms of accounting for change? There are deep-
rooted grievances among the population over the lack of change and development, 
which suddenly became apparent with the food and fuel crisis in 2009, when violent 
protests and riots took place in several places in the country. The government 
answered these protests by showing its willingness to use force, killing several 
protesters (M&G, 10 July 2009). Relying on material capabilities to maintain the 
current structure could further deteriorate the consent among both domestic and 
external forces. With the financial crisis gradually spreading around to the 
developing countries, it is likely to put further pressure on the poor, thus raising the 
demand for the delivery of vital services. A failure by the government to convince its 
external partners and the lower social forces domestically that it is working to their 
benefit might produce conducive conditions for the development of rival historic 
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blocs. Furthermore, the current crisis has large implications for the distribution of 
finance, which could change to production relations in Mozambique, thus change the 
configuration of forces in the current structure.  
The potential for structural change will ultimately largely depend on the different 
social forces‟ ability to create a new historic bloc. One way this could happen is 
through a strengthening of civil society and their capacity of creating new communal 
images that shape production relations and thus the power structure in Mozambique. 
Today this capacity is highly limited and the report Index of Civil Society in 
Mozambique 2007 finds that the development of civil society is limited because it is 
highly complicated to register organisations and that the legal framework makes it 
difficult to run such organisations. An alternative source of rival communal images 
could develop from civil society outside Mozambique. One example of such an 
influence is the Centre for Civil Society in Durban, who is in frequent contact with 
various Mozambican counterparts. The changes in leadership within the ANC could 
affect such interregional relations, but it is still too early to tell.   
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to explain the ways in which the form of state in 
Mozambique has changed as related to changes in social forces and how these 
forces have played a role in shaping the Mozambican development strategy. The 
main argument has been that the leading figures in Frelimo, that assumed power 
over production relations after independence, were quickly integrated into the 
transnational hegemonic class and adopted policies consistent with the Washington 
Consensus. Although this was initially explained through describing the relationship 
between the leading figures in Frelimo and the Bretton Woods Institutions in 
Washington D.C., it was argued that the political changes in South Africa had a big 
impact on the regional dynamics. More precisely, it was contended that the South 
African economic elite, the ANC and the Government of Mozambique collaborated 
closely in developing a regional development strategy, which was largely based the 
achievement of high growth through investment led mega-projects. This strategy, 
however, was described to have limited effects for the human development 
prospects of a large proportion of the Mozambican population. The last section of 
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the chapter examined the historical structure that the current state rests upon and 
evaluated the potential for structural change in Mozambique. Although it explained 
that current historic bloc seems stable, it was argued that financial crisis could have 
major implications for the development of rival social forces in the region.  
In the concluding chapter I will discuss the implications of this case study, both with 
regards to the usefulness of CCT as a theoretical framework in this context and in 
terms of what recommendation can be drawn to achieve structural change and 
improve Mozambique‟s chances of achieving the Millennium Development Goals.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The essence of this study has been about structural change and how it is affected by 
competing social forces. Based on the assumption that the theoretical framework 
used in analysing a social context has implications for how one assesses this context, 
I have attempted to understand how the Mozambican development policy has been 
shaped by different social actors. The main argument has been that the hegemonic 
neoliberalist ideology has been perpetuated in Mozambique by external social forces 
and has become the mainstay of the development approach in the country. By 
acknowledging that theory is used by different social groups for various purposes, I 
have tried to depart from the common assumption of considering the Mozambican 
development example as a success, and rather ask „for whom it has been a success‟.  
The objective of this study has been twofold. First, I argued that IPE theory has 
largely neglected the African context and that this has resulted in the 
underdevelopment of tools available to analysts. Furthermore I argued this lack of 
attention has led to a lack of understanding of African relations and thus to bad 
decisions on how to deal with security issues and development challenges. My first 
objective was therefore to find a theoretical framework that allowed for different 
points of entry so that it could be used in an African context. I then wanted to apply 
this theoretical framework to the analysis of the Mozambican development strategy 
to be better able to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses with the hope of 
improving this framework and thus contributing to improving the understanding of 
African IPE. My second objective was to use this newly gained insight into the 
Mozambican development strategy to assess how this strategy has been formed and 
whether there are any alternatives to the current situation.  
To attain these objectives I structured the study in three parts. In Chapter 2 I 
attempted to find a suitable theoretical framework and argued that CCT contained 
many of the elements that more traditional schools of IPE lack to understand the 
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African context. The initial part of the study was used to describe the different 
elements of CCT and its implications for this text. In the following chapter I 
evaluated how this framework had been applied by various scholars (Cox, 1987; 
Abrahamsson, 1997; Taylor, 2001; Leysens, 2002) on a world order, regional and 
domestic level. Through this evaluation I wanted to get an understanding for some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the application of CCT. Finally, in Chapter 4 I 
attempted to apply the theoretical framework to understand how social forces at 
different levels of society influence development policy in Mozambique. 
5.1 Main Findings 
In the evaluation of IPE theories that are suitable for analysing African state/society 
complexes, I found that some of the criticism against traditional schools of IPE fell 
short of addressing the underlying problems. More precisely I argued that the 
critique presented in Dunn and Shaw‟s (2001) volume was directed at adjusting 
concepts that are central to the neorealist schools of thought, rather than 
questioning fundamental ontological and epistemological problems. Furthermore I 
argued that CCT addresses these problems through questioning the role of theory 
itself and the nature of the entities that included in the analysis. There are two 
important implications from these arguments. Firstly one needs to take into account 
how theory itself is used to maintain a particular social order and cannot be seen as 
being a description of an objective “truth”. Perhaps of even more significance for this 
study is that one can move away from analysing the “state” as a single actor and 
rather understand how a structure continuously changes through exposure to social 
forces at different levels in society.  
From this point of departure I explained the way CCT regards production, power and 
world order to be closely related and interlinked. More precisely how production 
enables the formation of historical structures, in which certain individuals gain 
power, in turn affecting the composition of the world order. This relationship is not 
unilinear and can work the other way as well. Inspired by a Gramscian notion of 
hegemony, I described how CCT explained the rise of strong powers in the world 
order based on consent by the subordinate groups is central, thus making the use of 
force to maintain the order minimal. Furthermore, I explained that such a world 
85 
 
order consists of different spheres of human activities, Cox emphasises three 
important spheres: social forces (related to production), forms of state and world 
orders. When analysing relations in Africa I suggested that the inclusion of a regional 
sphere in the analysis could prove relevant to the analysis. 
At the end of the second chapter I included an evaluation of middle power theory. 
Moving beyond characterising states as middle powers on the basis of their physical 
characteristics, it was described how middle powers can be defined according to 
their foreign policy behaviour, where they often seek to morally elevate their actions 
as being in the interest of the international community. Although this differs from 
the way Cox (1989) uses the term, I argued that such an approach is valuable to the 
extent that it is used by various social forces to influence the historic bloc. In 
Chapter 4 I described how the post-apartheid ANC formed foreign policy, morally 
elevating their objectives beyond national interests, to include the responsibility of 
the region as a whole. In this way, I argued, they gained international 
acknowledgement for their policies, and in this way affected the domestic communal 
images of an expansionist role of the state. 
In the analysis of the implementation of CCT in Chapter 3 I found that Cox (1987) 
managed to describe the evolving nature of the world orders through combining a 
functionalist synchronic analysis with more historically based (diachronic) approach. 
In this way he is able to explain the transition from the liberal order, to the time of 
rival imperialisms, and finally to the neoliberal world order by illustrating how the 
forces that make up the historical structures produce and reproduce situations that 
are conducive to structural change. I put particular emphasis on Cox‟s description of 
how the neoliberal order was characterised by the internationalisation of production 
and the internationalising of the state. This description is important because it gave 
a logical explanation to how the different spheres in the world order interact, which 
becomes important in understanding the logic of the case study presented in 
Chapter 4.  
In the analysis of how CCT has been applied in case studies linked to Africa I look at 
the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework from different points of 
entry. From the evaluation of Abrahamsson‟s (1997) study I found that he gains 
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significant explanatory power by combing his analysis of the effect of the world 
order with an examination of the post-colonial power-structures in Mozambique. 
However, I argued that Abrahamsson could connect these two approaches even 
further and deepen his analysis of how they are influenced by each other. Another 
shortcoming in Abrahamsson‟s study that I pointed out was that his description of 
social forces is not sufficiently nuanced, particularly in relation to the hegemonic 
power. I found that Taylor (2001) addresses this issue to a larger extent in his 
description of the political transformation of post-apartheid South Africa. In this 
study he examines the how various social forces influence the economic policies of 
the ANC and its effects. I note, however, that Taylor does not explore the rival 
forces adequately and therefore fails to capture the full dynamics of the political 
complex situation in South Africa. I finally proceed to examine Leysens‟ (2002) text 
regarding the potential for revolt amongst the marginalised groups in Third World 
countries. I argued that his study provided useful insight to the social forces that are 
often considered to be an emancipatory class and underlines the importance of 
including a bottom up perspective in the analysis.  
The findings generated by the analysis of these various studies were of importance 
to the structure of the case study presented in Chapter 4. First, I evaluated how the 
colonial period impacted on the form of state set up by Frelimo after independence. 
Similarly to Abrahamsson‟s (1997) study, I then proceeded to evaluate how 
Mozambique was influenced by external actors. In addition to considering the 
influence of the hegemonic power in the world order, I included a regional approach 
to the analysis, thus capturing the significant role that South Africa has played in the 
post-apartheid period. Inspired by Taylor (2003), I put emphasis on explaining how 
various social forces influenced the formation of a development approach in 
Mozambique and the consequences of this. I finally evaluated the potential for 
structural change in Mozambique. This evaluation included a bottom up approach, as 
advocated by Leysens (2002), in order to capture the perspective of marginalised 
groups.   
This study brought me to a three main conclusions. Firstly, that Frelimo have failed 
to create a broad based consensus for its rule among different social forces in 
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Mozambique and that the historic bloc in Mozambique has been fragile. Secondly, 
that the economic elite in South Africa and the ANC collaborated with Frelimo in 
structuring the development strategy in Mozambique, and through this collaboration 
perpetuated values consistent with the hegemonic neoliberal consensus. Finally, that 
the historic structure in Mozambique is strengthened by the international community 
and that structural change is unlikely to take place without a stronger civil society. 
5.2 Implications of the study and prospects for further research 
The objectives of this study were highly ambitious: to improve the IPE framework to 
better capture social relations in the African context, and to contribute to improve 
the understanding of the historic bloc in Mozambique, in order to be better 
positioned to evaluate alternatives. So to what extent have the findings generated 
by the various chapters addressed the objectives of the study? With regards to 
improving the IPE framework, I believe that the main contribution of this study has 
been to evaluate how CCT has been applied in Africa, thus being able to draw 
conclusions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this theory. I would argue 
that CCT answers some of the shortcomings of neorealist and neoliberalist schools of 
IPE by providing a reasoning that focuses on how production enables both domestic 
and external forces to influence the social order rather than relying on a state centric 
that argument. CCT also provides an explanation of how structures change, and 
provide understanding of alternative structures in Africa.  
I would argue that the most important finding in this study is that the logic that Cox 
provides through his theoretical framework remains valid in the African context. 
What more, I would argue that his theories are highly compatible with other social 
theories and that it is possible to create synergies by combining them. One example 
would be to use include Tashfeld‟s understanding of social psychology to improve 
the understanding of how a group identity is formed and how it affects the decision 
of the individuals in it. There are also a number of interesting post-colonial studies 
that have captured important aspects of relations in Africa. Three important scholars 
have been briefly mentioned in this text, Chabal, Hydén and Mamdani, but a further 
exploration of how to use these theories together could prove fruitful.  
88 
 
When elevating the achievement of improving the objective of understanding of 
alternatives to the current development strategy in Mozambique, the case study in 
Chapter 4 has provided some findings. Although the scope of this study is too limited 
to generate conclusive evidence, the case study indicated first, that the involvement 
of external social forces have contributed to maintaining the current social order in 
Mozambique, and second, that rival forces are unlikely to pose a challenge to the 
historic bloc. The importance of these findings, however, is that they illustrate the 
importance of a theoretical perspective analysis and that they create a starting point 
for further and more comprehensive research.  
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